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ABSTRACT
GRADIENT FREE SIGN ACTIVATION ZERO ONE LOSS NEURAL
NETWORKS FOR ADVERSARIALLY ROBUST CLASSIFICATION
by
Yunzhe Xue
The zero-one loss function is less sensitive to outliers than convex surrogate losses
such as hinge and cross-entropy. However, as a non-convex function, it has a large
number of local minima, and its undifferentiable attribute makes it impossible to use
backpropagation, a method widely used in training current state-of-the-art neural
networks. When zero-one loss is applied to deep neural networks, the entire training
process becomes challenging. On the other hand, a massive non-unique solution
probably also brings different decision boundaries when optimizing zero-one loss,
making it possible to fight against transferable adversarial examples, which is a
common weakness in deep learning neural network models.
This dissertation introduces a stochastic coordinate descent to optimize the
linear classification model based on zero-one loss. Moreover, its variants are
successfully applied to multi-layer neural networks using sign activation and multi-
layer convolutional neural networks to obtain higher image classification performance.
In some image benchmark tests, the stochastic coordinate descent method achieves
accuracy close to that of the stochastic gradient descent method. At the same time,
some heuristic techniques are used, such as random node optimization, feature pool,
warm start, step training, additional backpropagation penetration, and other methods
to speed up training and save memory usage. Furthermore, the model’s adversarial
robustness is analyzed by conducting white-box attacks, decision boundary attacks,
and comparing zero-one loss models to those using more traditional loss functions
such as cross-entropy.
GRADIENT FREE SIGN ACTIVATION ZERO ONE LOSS NEURAL
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Machine learning has been widely used in many fields such as image recognition and
detection, face recognition, autonomous driving, speech recognition and translation.
Similar to the situation faced by traditional rule-based programming software systems,
these advanced machine learning applications inevitably have unique loopholes,
namely adversarial examples. Unlike traditional vulnerabilities, these adversarial
examples are not caused by incorrect programming of machine learning models.
Researchers expect that machine learning models can learn potential data rules based
on our given data. Nevertheless, due to the lack of a large amount of training data
and human logical thinking as a guide, it is difficult for machine learning models
and even for deep learning models to obtain human-level thinking modes. In a small
range of data, some interference that would not affect human’s understanding or
recognition of the subject can make a trained machine learning model to conduct
misjudgments, even though its recognition accuracy on clean data has reached the
human level. Based on this phenomenon, we can conclude that in the future, some
groups of people who have a good understanding of machine learning models will be
able to attack commercialized models and gain illegal profits.
Although there are published papers on counter attack defense every year, most
of their algorithms can only play a defensive role against one or a certain type of
attack. With the emergence of new attack methods, the problem of machine learning
model’s weak robustness to adversarial samples has not been fundamentally solved. In
other words, if a model is only trained on clean data, but without having adversarial
training against adversarial samples conducted, it is likely that it will not be resistant
to most attack methods. However, through adversarial training, they are likely to be
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able to defend against a certain type of attack method, and their robustness will be
greatly improved [57, 24].
There are many machine learning algorithms, including but not limited to, linear
regression, logistic regression, support vector machine, multiple layers perceptron,
and tree methods such as decision tree and random forest. Most traditional machine
learning methods do not have complex logical structures and nonlinear mappings. In
recent years, the rapid development of deep learning has enabled multi-layer models
to achieve excellent performance. Such models have complex logical structures and
multiple non-linear mappings.
There are two main common types of adversarial attacks: black-box attacks and
white-box attacks. A white-box attack is an attack ran when all the information of the
target model is available. A black-box attack runs when the target model information
cannot be obtained, and the output can only be obtained through feeding input
data in the model. White-box attacks mainly use the deep learning model mapping
function’s derivability and inject small changes to the source data to increase the
loss function value on the data to obtain incorrect solutions. When the mapping
function is not differentiable, the derivative can be solved by an approximate method.
The mainstream situation of black-box attacks is divided into two categories, one
is related to transferability, and another one is to obtain the minimum distortion
distance or the minimum number of queries. Deep learning models are generally
based on backpropagation methods to solve similar loss functions. If these models are
trained on similar tasks or similar datasets, their adversarial examples are likely to be
transferable between each other. For example, multiple models with similar structures
or different models are trained for the same classification task, and a certain attack
method can be used to synthesize adversarial samples for a certain model. These
adversarial samples can not only deceive the source model, but also are likely to be
effective for other models. The reason is that based on the same loss function, the
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approximate optimal solution obtained by backpropagation is expected to be similar.
That is, the mapping function from the source data to the probability output of
different categories is similar. Based on this assumption, if there is a certain loss
function, or a solution method, by which solving a certain task can result in multiple
inconsistent or dissimilar solutions, then it can alleviate this problem to a certain
extent. 01 loss is such a loss function. For black-box attacks, common attack methods
require constant access to the model to test on the decision boundary. If the mapping
function of the target model is not smooth, it will inevitably increase the difficulty of
the search, so the robustness can be improved [45]. The 01 activation function causes
a large number of local minima in the solving process, and the mapping function is
extremely unsmooth. Based on the speculation mentioned above, the model using
Sign activation function and zero-one loss can naturally possess better robustness
than the derivative activation function and convex function loss model. However,
this combination makes the solving process noticeably difficult, especially when the
deep model is widely used now. Optimizing the deep model to have an accuracy close
to that of the differentiable deep model becomes a challenge.
In the second chapter of this paper, we first introduced several commonly used
loss functions, activation functions, and optimization methods in machine learning
or deep learning. Furthermore, we introduced what adversarial examples and the
definition of model robustness are. Lastly, the classic white-box attack and black-box
attack methods are introduced.
In the third chapter, we discussed the application of 01 loss in linear and
non-linear classifier, and the loss function is solved by stochastic coordinate descent.
In experiments, we evaluated the effect of several hyperparameters on accuracy in the
stochastic coordinate descent experiment. The performance of stochastic coordinate
descent and stochastic gradient descent under the same network structure, and the
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influence of activation on the model are compared. This is a trial of stochastic
coordinate descent on a shallow neural network.
Chapter 4 introduces the problems that arise from directly applying stochastic
coordinate descent to convolutional neural networks (CNN). In response to these
problems, the training method has been improved. The main changes are cancellation
of bias, multi-phase training, and additional backpropagation penetration strategy.
The model performance is shown on CIFAR10 and STL10 datasets. It is verified
that the modified stochastic coordinate descent can be used to optimize deeper
convolutional neural networks.
Chapter 5 shows the robustness of Sign activation Multiple Layers Perceptron
(MLP) and deep CNN optimized by stochastic coordinate descent on image datasets.
Experiments include white-box attacks based on Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
and Project Gradient Descent (PGD), transferability of adversarial samples from
different models, and decision boundary attacks.




A loss function is a kind of function in mathematical optimization theory that maps
one or more value or variables to another real number [49], which intuitively represents
some“cost” associated with the event. “An optimization method seeks to reduce loss
calculated from a given loss function. An objective function can be a loss function (in
a specific domain, it is called a return function, a profit function, a utility function,
a fitness function, etc.). In this case, it is necessary to be maximized.” 1 In machine
learning, the loss function is often used to evaluate the degree of difference between
the predicted value of the model and the true value. The better the loss function, the
stronger the performance of the model will be obtained after training. In classification
tasks, common loss functions and their advantages and disadvantages are as follows.
2.1 Loss Function
2.1.1 Zero-One Loss
zero-one loss means that the loss is 1 when the predicted value is not equal to the
true value, otherwise it is 0. It is often used to directly judge the number of errors in
classification prediction. As a non-convex function, it is very difficult to solve [34].
L(y, f(x)) =

1, y 6= f(x)
0, y = f(x)
(2.1)
2.1.2 Cross Entropy Loss




[y ln a+ (1− y) ln(1− a)] (2.2)
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loss functioncite note-Raschka 2019 p.-1
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In the standard formula, x represents the sample, y represents the actual
category, a represents the probability predicted by the model, and n represents
the total number of samples. In the binary classification, the probability is usually
obtained by the sigmoid function, in the multi-classification, the probability is usually
obtained by the softmax [17], and the loss function is




yi ln ai (2.3)
2.1.3 Hinge Loss
Hinge loss means that if the data is classified correctly, the loss is 0, otherwise it is
1− yf(x). SVM often uses this loss function. Hinge loss formula is below
L(y, f(x)) = max(0, 1− yf(x)) (2.4)
2.2 Activation Function
Activation Function is a function that runs on the neurons of the artificial neural
network and serves to map the input of the neuron to the output.
Figure 2.1 Activation function.
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Activation functions are essential for learning and understanding complex non-
linear functions in artificial neural networks models. Using an activation function is
a major way in which neurons in an artificial neural network roughly approximate
biological neurons. As shown in Figure 2.1, the inputs are weighted and summed in the
neuron, and then a function is applied. This function is the activation function, which
is introduced to increase the nonlinearity of the neural network model. Each layer
without activation function is equivalent to matrix multiplication. If the activation
function is not used, the output of each layer is a linear mapping of the upper layer
input. No matter how many layers of the neural network there are, the output is
a linear combination of inputs. This situation is the most primitive Perceptron. If
used, the activation function introduces a non-linear factor to the neuron. The neural
network can approximate any non-linear function arbitrarily [39].
2.2.1 ReLU (Recitified Linear Unit)
Rectifying activation functions (ReLU) were used to separate specific excitation
and unspecific inhibition in the neural abstraction pyramid, which was trained in
a supervised way to learn several computer vision tasks. In 2011, the apply of
the rectifier as a non-linearity activation has been shown to effectively train deep
supervised neural networks without requiring unsupervised pre-training. Rectified
linear units [26], compared to sigmoid function or similar activation functions, allow
faster and effective training of deep neural architectures on large and complex
datasets. The function is
f(x) =

0, x < 0
x, x ≥ 0
(2.5)




0, x < 0
1, x ≥ 0
(2.6)
2.2.2 Sign
Sign function or binary step function is a kind of threshold-based activation function
which activate neuron if projection bigger than a certain threshold and deactivate the
neuron if projection below the threshold [21]. The function is
f(x) =

−1, x < 0
1, x ≥ 0
(2.7)
and derivative form is
f(x) =

0, x 6= 0
?, x = 0
(2.8)
This step function activation can hardly be applied if there are multiple classes
to deal with, but works well in binary classification.
2.3 Optimization Method
2.3.1 Gradient Descent
Gradient descent is one of iterative methods that can be applied to solve linear or
nonlinear least squares problems. When searching the model parameters of machine
learning algorithms, that is, unconstrained optimization problems, Gradient Descent
is widely used, and another commonly used method is the least squares method.
The gradient descent method could be applied to acquire the minimum value of
loss function iteratively, to obtain the minimized loss function and model parameter
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values. Conversely, if we need to achieve the maximum value of loss functions, then
we need to use the gradient ascent method. In machine learning, two gradient descent
methods have been developed based on the basic gradient descent method, namely
stochastic gradient descent method [6, 69] and batch gradient descent method.
2.3.2 Coordinate Descent
Coordinate Descent is a optimization algorithm does not require gradient information.
In each iteration of the optimization process, searching in one dimension is performed
along a coordinate direction at the current position to find a local minimum of a
given function. In the whole process, different coordinate directions are searched
cyclically. For inseparable functions, Coordinate Descent may hardly find the optimal
solution in a small number of iterations. In order to accelerate the convergence, an
appropriate coordinate system can be used. For example, a new coordinate system
with as little correlation as possible between the coordinates is obtained through
principal component analysis [61, 22, 59].
2.4 Adversarial Attack
In recent years, many works [28, 30, 56] shows that deep neural network (DNN) are
vulnerable to adversarial examples, not matter in image, text, audio classification,
or graph application area [18, 33, 70, 52]. As a result, the existence of adversarial
attacks has admonished researchers against directly adopting DNNs in safety-critical
tasks in all machine learning application fields. Meanwhile, many studies tried
to find countermeasures for preventing deep neural network from these adversarial
examples’ threat, such as Gradient Masking [48, 2], Robust Optimization [41, 36],
and Adversary Detection [9, 66]. In other words, studying adversarial examples and
their countermeasures is helpful for us to understand and improve DNN consequently.
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There are works [28, 32] could help us earn more insight into deep neural networks
by explaining and interpreting the existence of adversarial examples of DNNs [65].
2.4.1 Adversarial Examples
Adversarial example is a case with slightly intentional feature perturbations that
cause a machine learning or deep learning model to make incorrect predictions [28].
Adversarial examples could cause deep learning models vulnerable to attacks, as in
the following scenarios: A autonomous car crashed into another vehicle because it
ignored a stop sign. The reason that it was ignored was because a picture was placed
over the sign, which made it look like a little dirt for humans like Figure 2.3 shows, on
the purpose of faking it to appear like a parking prohibition sign in the view of sign
recognition software of the car. A spam detector failed to classify an email as spam.
The spam email was designed to resemble a normal email, but with the intention of
cheating the recipient.
Figure 2.2 An adversarial input, overlaid on a typical image, can cause a classifier
to miscategorize a panda as a gibbon.
Source: [28].
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Figure 2.3 Sample of physical adversarial examples against deep neural networks.
All the STOP signs were misclassified as speed limit 45 sign, and right turn signs
were misclassified as STOP sign.
Source: [20].
2.4.2 Adversarial Attack
The adversarial attack is injecting small distortion into source data to fool a machine
learning system. Suppose there is a classifier and F represents the projection from
source data x to corresponding output y, as well as F (x) = y. We want to inject
some noise to x, and let the new fake data to be x′. The euclidean distance between
x′ and x should be smaller than a threshold ε to avoid the injection been detected.
Finally, the classifier will predict the data x′ as y‘ but y′ 6= y.
find x′ satisfying ||x′ − x|| ≤ ε
such that F (x′) 6= y
(2.9)
An ideal adversarial attack method could generate a lot of adversarial examples
with minor distortion undetected by the human in a short time [46]. So its properties
should be high attack success rate, fast generating speed, and small distortion.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced the basic information of loss functions, activation
functions, and optimization methods that will be involved in our experiments in later
chapters. In addition, we described what an adversarial example is and the definition
of the adversarial attack.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMIZING LINEAR CLASSIFIER AND MULTIPLE LAYERS
PERCEPTRON BY STOCHASTIC COORDINATE DESCENT
3.1 Loss Function
3.1.1 Loss Function For Linear Classifier
Figure 3.1 Zero-one loss for linear classifier.
To decide the hyperplane with minimum number of misclassifications in a binary
classification task is known to be NP-hard [4]. In mainstream machine learning







(1− sign(yi(wTxi + w0))) (3.1)
where w ∈ Rd, w0 ∈ R is the hyperplane, and xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {+1,−1}.∀i =
0...n − 1 are training data. Popular linear classifiers such as the linear support
vector machine, perceptron, and logistic regression [1] can be considered as convex
approximations to this problem that yield fast gradient descent solutions [3]. However,
they are also more sensitive to outliers than the zero-one loss [3, 44, 64] and more
prone to mislabeled data than zero-one loss [42, 25, 40].
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3.1.2 Loss Function For Multiple Layers Perceptron
Figure 3.2 Zero-one loss for two layers neural network.
Here, zero-one loss is extended to a simple two-layer neural network with k
hidden nodes, and sign activation that we call the MLP01loss. This objective for







(1− sign(yi(wT (sign(W Txi +W0)) + w0))) (3.2)
where W ∈ Rd×k, W0 ∈ Rk are the hidden layer parameters, w ∈ Rk, w0 ∈ R
are the final layer node parameters, xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {+1,−1}.∀i = 0...n − 1 are the
training data, and sign(v ∈ Rk) = (sign(v0), sign(v1), ..., sign(vk−1)). While this
is a straightforward model to define, optimizing it is a different story altogether.
Optimizing even a single node is NP-hard which makes optimizing this network
much harder. Note that our weights are real numbers as opposed to binarized neural
networks whose weights are constrained to be +1 and -1 or 1 and 0 [23, 14, 50].
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3.2 Algorithm Description
3.2.1 Stochastic Coordinate Descent For Linear Classifier
Algorithm 1 is our core coordinate descent algorithm. We perform just one iterative
update instead of convergence. We find this to be more accurate and faster [68].
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Algorithm 1 Stochastic Coordinate Descent
Input: Data (feature vectors) xi ∈ Rd for i = 0..n− 1 with labels yi ∈ {+1,−1}, winc ∈ R, size of pooled features
to update k, vector w ∈ Rd and w0 ∈ R
Output: Vector w ∈ Rd and w0 ∈ R
Procedure:
1. Initialization: If w is null then let each feature wi of w be normally drawn from N(0, 1). We set ‖w‖ = 1 and
throughout our search ensure that ‖w‖ = 1 by renormalizing each time w changes.
2. Let the number of misclassified points with negative wT xi be errorminus = 0 and those with positive w
T xi be
errorplus = 0. These are later used in the Optimal Threshold algorithm called Opt (see below) for fast update of
our objective.
3. Compute the initial data projection wT xi, ∀i = 0..n − 1, sort the projection with insertion sort, and initialize
(w0, obj) = Opt(wT x, y, 0, n− 1). We also record the value of j for the optimal w0 = (wT xj + wT xj+1)/2.
4. Set prevobj =∞, done = 0.
while done != 1 do
Set prevobj = obj
Randomly pick k of the d feature indices.
for all selected features wi we update them do
1. Assume the optimal w0 = (wT xj + w
T xj+1)/2
2. Set start = wT xj−10 and end = wT xj+10
3. Modify coordinate wi by winc, compute data projection w
T xi∀i = 0..n− 1, and sort the projection with
insertion sort
4. Set (w0, obj) = Opt(wT x, y, start, end) and record this value for feature wi
5. Reset w0 to try the next coordinate
end for
Pick the coordinate whose update gives the largest decrease in the objective and set (w0, obj) to the values given
by the best coordinate with ties decided randomly.
Set done = 1
end while=0
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Algorithm 2 Optimal Threshold w0 and Zero-One Loss Objective Value
Input: wT xi ∈ Rd for i = 0..n− 1 with labels yi ∈ {+1,−1}, start, end
Output: Optimal w0 ∈ R with minimum (balanced) 01 loss and the loss value obj
Procedure:





3: if yi(wT xi + w′0) == 0 then
4: If yi == 1 then errorplus++
5: else if yi(wT xi + w′0) > 0 then
6: If yi == 1 then errorplus−− else errorminus−−
7: else if yi(wT xi + w′0) < 0 then
8: If yi == 1 then errorplus++ else errorminus++
9: end if
10: If obj′ = errorplus+errorminus
n
is lower than current best objective obj then obj = obj′ and w0 = w′0.
11: end for
12: return (w0, obj) =0
Algorithm 2 is our fast algorithm to update w0 and the model objective. Once










Algorithm 3 Stochastic Coordinate Descent For Linear Zero-One Loss
Input: Data (feature vectors) xi ∈ Rd with labels yi ∈ {+1,−1}, number of votes rr ∈ N (Natural numbers),
number of iterations per votet it ∈ N (Natural numbers), batch size as a percent of training data p ∈ [0, 1], and
winc ∈ R
Output: Total of rr pairs of (bestw ∈ Rd, bestw0 ∈ R) after each vote
Procedure:
Set j = 0
while j < rr do
1. Set bestw = null, bestw0 = null, bestloss =∞
for i = 0 to it do
1. Randomly pick p percent of rows as input training data to the coordinate descent algorithm and run it to
completion starting with the values of w and w0 from the previous call to it (if i == 0 we set w = null, w0 =
null).
2. In the next step we calculate the linear 01 loss objective on the full input training set
if objective(w,w0) < objective(bestw, bestw0) then
Set bestw = w, bestw0 = w0, and bestloss = objective(w,w0)
end if
end for
2. Output bestw and bestw0
3. Set j = j + 1.
end while
We output all (bestw, bestw0) pairs across the votes. We can use the pair with the lowest objective or the majority
vote of all pairs for prediction. =0
Algorithm 3 is our stochastic descent search performs coordinate descent for
the model parameters w,w0. We keep track of the best parameters across iterations
by evaluating the model objective on the full dataset after each iteration.
3.2.2 Stochastic Coordinate Descent For Multiple Layers Perceptron
Algorithm 4 is our method to optimize two layer neural network. Our stochastic
descent search performs coordinate descent on the final node and then a random
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Algorithm 4 Stochastic Coordinate Descent for Two Layer Zero-One Loss Network
Input: Data (feature vectors) xi ∈ Rd with labels yi ∈ {+1,−1}, number of hidden nodes h, number of votes
rr ∈ N (Natural numbers), number of iterations per vote it ∈ N , batch size as a percent of training data p ∈ [0, 1],
winc ∈ R and winc2 ∈ R
Output: Total of rr sets of (bestW ∈ Rk×d, bestW0 ∈ Rk, bestw ∈ Rk, bestw0 ∈ R) after each vote
Procedure:
1. Initialize all network weights W,w to random values from the Normal distribution N(0, 1).
2. Set network thresholds W0 to the median projection value on their corresponding weight vectors and w0 to the
projection value that minimizes our network objective.
while j < rr do
Set bestW = null, bestW0 = null, bestw = null, bestw0 = null, bestloss =∞
for i = 0 to it do
Randomly pick p percent of rows as input training data.
Run the Coordinate Descent Algorithm 1 on the final output node w to completion starting with the values
of w and w0 from the previous call to it (if i == 0 we set w = null). We use learning rate winc2 in the
coordinate descent.
Run the Coordinate Descent Algorithm 1 on a randomly selected hidden node wk (k
th column in W ) starting
with the values of wk and wk0 (k
th entry in W0) from the previous call to it (if i == 0 we set wk = null).
We use learning rate winc in the coordinate descent for the hidden nodes.
Calculate the two layer network 01 loss objective on the full input training set
if objective(W,W0, w, w0) < objective(bestW, bestW0, bestw, bestw0) then
Set bestW = W , bestW0 = W0, bestw = w, bestw0 = w0, and bestloss =
objective(bestW, bestW0, bestw, bestw0)
end if
end for
Output (bestW , bestW0, bestw, bestw0)
Set j = j + 1.
end while
We output all sets of (bestW, bestW0, bestw, bestw0) across the votes. We can use the first set or the majority vote
of all sets for predictions.
=0
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hidden node in each iteration. We keep track of the best parameters across iterations
by evaluating the model objective on the full dataset after each iteration.
3.3 Experiments
We built a two-layer neural network as a baseline model. This neural network uses
zero-one loss as the loss function and contains 20 nodes in the hidden layer - all
of the nodes use Sign as the activation function. Since image data is currently the
primary research object of machine learning model adversarial robustness, we selected
class 0 and class 1 from CIFAR10 to train our model. We evaluated the impact of
multiple key hyperparameters, such as step size, batch size, pool size, when optimizing
zero-one loss through stochastic gradient descent. Finally, we evaluated the baseline
model’s performance on the CIFAR10 and STL10 data sets, and both are ten class
benchmarks. Our algorithm focuses on solving binary classification problems, so
we split the 10 class datasets into sub-datasets composed of two classes in each of
CIFAR10 and STL10. In other words, each dataset has a total of 45 sub-datasets. In
addition, we also trained a ReLU activation MLP, a Sign activation MLP optimized
using an approximated gradient method, and a ReLU activation MLP optimized using
stochastic coordinate descent as references to evaluate our performance algorithm.
3.3.1 Datasets
CIFAR10 “The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60000 32x32 colour images in 10
classes, with 6000 images per class. There are 50000 training images and 10000 test
images. The dataset is divided into five training batches and one test batch, each
with 10000 images. The test batch contains exactly 1000 randomly-selected images
from each class. The training batches contain the remaining images in random order,
but some training batches may contain more images from one class than another.
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Between them, the training batches contain exactly 5000 images from each class”.
1[35].
Figure 3.3 CIFAR10 dataset. Here are the classes in the dataset, as well as 10
random images from each.
STL10 “The STL-10 dataset is an image recognition dataset for developing
unsupervised feature learning, deep learning, self-taught learning algorithms. It is
inspired by the CIFAR-10 dataset but with some modifications. In particular, each
class has fewer labeled training examples than in CIFAR-10, but a very large set of
unlabeled examples is provided to learn image models prior to supervised training.
The primary challenge is to make use of the unlabeled data (which comes from
1see https://www.cs.toronto.edu/ kriz/cifar.html
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a similar but different distribution from the labeled data) to build a useful prior.
We also expect that the higher resolution of this dataset (96x96) will make it a
challenging benchmark for developing more scalable unsupervised learning methods.
[13].10 classes: airplane, bird, car, cat, deer, dog, horse, monkey, ship, truck. Images
are 96x96 pixels, color. 500 training images (10 pre-defined folds), 800 test images
per class. 100000 unlabeled images for unsupervised learning. These examples are
extracted from a similar but broader distribution of images. For instance, it contains
other types of animals (bears, rabbits, etc.) and vehicles (trains, buses, etc.) in
addition to the ones in the labeled set. Images were acquired from labeled examples
on ImageNet”.[15] 2
3.3.2 Hyperparameters
Stochastic Coordinate Descent (SCD) is a heuristic search algorithm. Its purpose
is to update one coordinate, which is the weight corresponding to a feature, at
a time, and obtain the lowest loss value available in each iteration. Therefore,
the choice of hyperparameters will have a significant impact on the search effect.
A good set of parameters can help searching to achieve higher accuracy upper
bound, and bring faster loss convergence speed. Due to significantly different
feature dimensions, distributions, and inconsistent classification difficulties in various
datasets, the optimal parameter set found in one dataset may not be the best in other
datasets. This situation is similar to Stochastic Gradient Descent (the batch size
depends on the size of the entire dataset, batch size and learning rate will affect each
other) [6]. However, the optimal hyperparameters picked from different datasets are
normally similar in our algorithm, saving researchers time spent on tuning parameters.
Step size controls how far each coordinate update moves. From the Figure 3.5
we can see bigger step size achieve higher accuracy/lower loss, 0.2 is a optimal one.
2see https://cs.stanford.edu/ acoates/stl10/
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Figure 3.4 Randomly picked picture samples from STL10 dataset.
Because we normalize weights after each move, the actual step size will be wi+winc||w|| . wi
is the coordinate to be update, winc is the step size, ||w|| is the length of the weight
vector. Bigger step size will make the overall weights more sparse after normalization.
We recommend smaller step size for higher dimension.
Iterations is the total number of iterations in training. More iterations will
increase the training time linearly. During the training, we reserve the weights to
achieve the highest training accuracy. In Figure 3.6, after 1000 iterations, the training
accuracy is still increasing but the test accuracy curve begins to oscillate. Considering
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Table 3.1 Hyperparameters in Zero-One Loss Stochastic Coordinate Descent
Hyperparameters Description
Step size winc in Algorithm 1
Iterations The number of iterations, it in Algorithm 3
Batch size The ratio of training data sampling in each iteration
Pool size The number of coordinates/features will be considered and
updated in each inner loop
Interval The number of neighbours considered in best bias searching
Votes The number of models used in majority votes
Figure 3.5 Different step size affect training. Step size includes 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3,
0.4, 0.5. X-axis is iteration, Y-axis is loss or accuracy.
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Figure 3.6 Different iterations affect training process. X-axis is iteration, Y-axis is
loss or accuracy.
that we usually use majority vote on multiple diverse weaker models to obtain a stable
accuracy, We suggest to pick a good checkpoint in an earlier iteration to save time.
In Figure 3.6, we prefer training stop at the 1000 iteration because later ones are not
significantly better than it.
Batch size In each iteration, we pick p of data to train the model. Figure 3.7
shows that bigger batch size bring higher accuracy and more stable converge curve.
This is because a smaller batch can help the searching jump off the local minimum,
but it cannot represent the distribution of the whole dataset. As the sampling ratio
increases, that batch’s data distribution will be more similar to the whole dataset.
In other words, the best weight in a bigger batch has a higher probability of being
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Figure 3.7 Different batch size affect training. Batch size includes 0.05, 0.1, 0.25,
0.5, 0.75, 0.9. X-axis is iteration, Y-axis is loss or accuracy.
the best for the whole dataset. Nevertheless, we cannot use all data in each iteration
because of the local minimum problem. Sampling ratios of 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9 achieve
similar performance because of diminishing marginal effect. We prefer the ratio of
0.75 as an optimal one because it performs better than the ratio of 0.5 in test data,
and takes less time to train the model than the ratio of 0.9.
Pool size is the maximum number of features considered to decide which
coordinate should be updated. Once we have a new batch of data and a corresponding
global bias, we will pick k features from the previous layer and select the best update
on weight coordinate of those features. In general, we would not go through all
features because computing complexity of this part is O(nk). If all features’ dimension
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Figure 3.8 Different pool size affect training. Intervals include 64, 128, 256. X-axis
is iteration, Y-axis is loss or accuracy.
is t and t >> k, the complexity can be approximately treated as O(n). In practice,
selecting a good pool size can save much computing time without losing accuracy. In
Figure 3.8, we see the difference between pool sizes of 64, 128, 256 is small, and the
difference will almost disappear after the majority of votes. CIFAR10 dataset’s image
feature dimension is 3072(=32*32*3). However, if we trained the model on ImageNet
(the general dimension is more than 150,000), we would need to increase pool size
since the dimension is too big.
Interval After we get a global bias for a new batch during the training, we
should review some coordinates updating and their corresponding bias. Nevertheless,
it is unnecessary to search the bias for all unique projections again because the
coordinates updating would not affect most data points’ signs. We only review the
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Figure 3.9 Different intervals affect training. Intervals include 5, 10, 20. X-axis is
iteration, Y-axis is loss or accuracy.
neighbor data points whose projection is around the global bias we found. Interval
decides how many data points we should look at on each side of the global bias. If
the interval is k, and global bias B = pi+pi+1
2
, we will only search the bias b across
projections [pi−k, pi−k+1, ..., pi+k−2, pi+k]. In Figure 3.9, we see there is no significant
difference among intervals of 5, 10, 20. Actually, we found that interval of 20 is more
stable, and it does not take too much longer on computing than interval of 10.
3.3.3 Comparison
We compared our models performance to convex models, and training hyperpa-
rameters are listed in Table 3.2. Image data will be scaled to range [0, 1] by divided
by 255.
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1. MLP-BCE-BP is a binary cross-entropy loss two layer ReLu activation neural
network with 20 hidden nodes optimized by stochastic gradient descent.
2. MLP-BCE-BAN (Binary Activated Network) is a binary cross-entropy
loss two layer sign activation neural network with 20 hidden nodes optimized
by stochastic gradient descent. Because sign activation is non-differentiable,
we approximate the gradient like linear activation, but clip the gradient if the
activation projection value more than mean in this batch.
3. MLP-01-SCD is a zero-one loss two layer Sign activation neural network with
20 hidden nodes optimized by our stochastic coordinate descent.
4. MLP-BCE-SCD is a binary cross-entropy loss two layer ReLu activation
neural network with 20 hidden nodes optimized by our stochastic coordinate
descent. We show that our stochastic coordinate descent can achieve similar
performance when the network structure is the same as MLP-BCE-BP. In
other words, Sign activation is the major reason cause performance dropped
on MLP-01-SCD compared to MLP-BCE-BP.
Table 3.2 Models’ Hyperparameters Setting in Training
Model MLP-BCE-BP/BAN MLP-01/BCE-SCD
Learning rate 0.01 0.17
Batch size 200 0.75
Epoch 200 1000
Optimizer SGD /
weight decay 1.00E-04 /
Nesterov TRUE /
Pool size / 128
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the accuracy of the four basic models in the 45
subgroups of CIFAR10 and STL10. Table 3.5 summarizes the results and compares
the performance of the benchmark model with MLP-BCE-BP. We can see that
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Table 3.3 Training Accuracy (Testing Accuracy) of MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-
BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD on CIFAR10 and STL10, Each Model is a
Ensembling of Eight Votes (A)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
0 vs 1 95.04 (90.75) 97.26 (87.90) 90.24 (85.40) 92.92 (89.45) 92.20 (81.19) 95.50 (81.94) 96.30 (80.19) 100.00 (84.06)
0 vs 2 90.40 (85.25) 92.34 (84.20) 85.52 (80.80) 90.28 (85.25) 96.60 (85.50) 97.20 (83.94) 97.50 (86.81) 100.00 (88.50)
0 vs 3 97.25 (90.35) 95.65 (88.45) 89.56 (85.55) 93.53 (88.95) 93.30 (85.12) 94.10 (84.88) 96.50 (84.81) 100.00 (86.81)
0 vs 4 95.20 (89.80) 94.52 (88.30) 88.87 (86.00) 92.98 (88.70) 92.50 (85.69) 96.30 (85.25) 97.20 (84.81) 100.00 (85.25)
0 vs 5 97.45 (90.90) 97.11 (89.25) 91.02 (86.30) 94.66 (90.65) 91.50 (85.38) 94.70 (84.81) 97.20 (85.81) 100.00 (87.94)
0 vs 6 97.18 (93.40) 97.28 (92.00) 93.51 (90.70) 96.22 (92.70) 94.40 (86.75) 95.20 (86.44) 96.90 (87.56) 100.00 (88.88)
0 vs 7 96.65 (90.25) 97.27 (88.20) 89.90 (85.40) 93.80 (89.65) 93.20 (87.56) 92.10 (87.38) 97.60 (88.19) 100.00 (90.50)
0 vs 8 92.28 (83.25) 92.66 (81.75) 84.27 (78.90) 88.45 (82.95) 86.90 (78.19) 93.20 (78.69) 94.30 (75.44) 100.00 (80.56)
0 vs 9 93.83 (88.55) 96.27 (85.05) 89.69 (84.85) 92.75 (87.25) 95.20 (81.50) 94.90 (80.69) 96.30 (83.38) 100.00 (84.38)
1 vs 2 98.32 (92.25) 98.05 (89.55) 93.67 (89.45) 96.48 (92.00) 97.60 (88.31) 95.60 (86.75) 98.60 (86.94) 100.00 (91.00)
1 vs 3 96.63 (91.10) 98.04 (89.45) 92.00 (87.35) 96.17 (91.15) 77.80 (65.06) 89.80 (66.56) 95.90 (64.75) 100.00 (67.00)
1 vs 4 98.65 (93.85) 98.32 (91.75) 94.37 (90.50) 97.32 (93.50) 78.50 (68.44) 93.00 (70.31) 96.60 (67.94) 100.00 (70.75)
1 vs 5 99.52 (93.10) 98.32 (90.35) 92.64 (88.10) 96.72 (92.50) 72.90 (62.94) 87.70 (64.06) 96.50 (63.69) 100.00 (64.75)
1 vs 6 99.33 (94.60) 98.82 (92.10) 95.66 (92.65) 98.04 (94.50) 82.40 (72.81) 92.50 (73.19) 97.50 (69.75) 100.00 (77.00)
1 vs 7 98.77 (92.65) 98.70 (89.80) 92.16 (88.50) 96.63 (92.55) 77.20 (63.06) 88.90 (62.69) 95.10 (61.12) 100.00 (63.50)
1 vs 8 93.73 (87.40) 96.20 (86.35) 89.44 (84.10) 93.50 (86.95) 97.70 (89.94) 97.20 (88.50) 97.00 (87.81) 100.00 (90.12)
1 vs 9 88.31 (77.50) 91.02 (76.20) 78.70 (70.75) 85.33 (76.60) 98.20 (87.50) 95.90 (85.62) 97.80 (85.62) 100.00 (88.69)
2 vs 3 86.88 (77.20) 87.00 (75.95) 83.73 (74.90) 84.73 (77.65) 98.60 (86.56) 97.00 (84.88) 99.00 (83.44) 100.00 (87.38)
2 vs 4 87.81 (74.25) 88.97 (72.90) 76.51 (66.65) 81.81 (73.40) 99.00 (89.12) 96.70 (87.44) 98.30 (88.75) 100.00 (90.00)
2 vs 5 85.45 (77.95) 90.29 (77.15) 83.10 (73.80) 85.30 (77.65) 98.60 (88.44) 96.60 (86.62) 97.40 (86.06) 100.00 (89.12)
2 vs 6 91.45 (83.20) 92.94 (81.65) 83.16 (76.90) 87.18 (82.25) 98.80 (88.62) 97.00 (87.12) 98.70 (86.12) 100.00 (88.75)
2 vs 7 90.20 (83.95) 93.66 (82.25) 86.27 (79.85) 89.27 (83.45) 99.60 (88.94) 96.50 (86.75) 99.20 (85.88) 100.00 (89.44)
2 vs 8 97.29 (91.65) 97.33 (90.65) 91.70 (86.95) 95.15 (91.75) 94.30 (81.88) 95.80 (81.38) 96.40 (82.94) 100.00 (84.94)
2 vs 9 96.86 (91.80) 97.24 (89.80) 93.02 (89.35) 94.95 (91.85) 84.60 (70.31) 92.20 (70.50) 96.60 (67.75) 100.00 (69.88)
MLP-BCE-BP has the best performance in CIFAR10. The performance of the
equivalent structure network optimized by scd (MLP-BCE-SCD) is very close to
the benchmark model, and the performance loss is as small as 1%. This shows
that using the same loss function, the search accuracy of SCD can be close to
SGD. In STL10, MLP-BCE-SCD is 2% better than MLP-BCE-BP. After replacing
ReLu in the network with Sign, the accurate gradient cannot be obtained due to
non-differentiable activation function. Backpropagation cannot be used directly to
solve the problem, but the approximate gradient can be obtained. Limited by the
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Table 3.4 Training Accuracy (Testing Accuracy) of MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-
BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD on CIFAR10 and STL10, Each Model is a
Ensembling of Eight Votes (B)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
3 vs 4 92.30 (80.50) 93.13 (79.40) 85.92 (78.85) 88.19 (80.55) 76.70 (68.94) 90.00 (70.50) 97.00 (66.88) 100.00 (68.25)
3 vs 5 79.13 (65.20) 74.02 (63.50) 70.53 (62.60) 76.88 (65.70) 66.80 (59.69) 86.90 (60.25) 97.30 (56.88) 100.00 (58.94)
3 vs 6 85.67 (80.45) 90.05 (79.50) 83.38 (77.80) 86.10 (80.65) 81.60 (70.62) 93.50 (71.44) 96.90 (69.38) 100.00 (72.06)
3 vs 7 92.43 (83.10) 95.59 (81.90) 85.35 (79.25) 89.64 (83.05) 77.60 (64.81) 88.70 (65.81) 95.90 (59.38) 100.00 (63.38)
3 vs 8 95.55 (91.35) 97.32 (89.65) 92.25 (87.55) 95.40 (91.45) 96.00 (89.44) 96.80 (89.44) 96.90 (88.31) 100.00 (90.06)
3 vs 9 97.75 (90.25) 96.82 (87.75) 89.94 (84.55) 93.94 (88.85) 93.10 (86.75) 95.70 (84.88) 97.90 (85.38) 100.00 (87.62)
4 vs 5 91.36 (80.95) 93.27 (78.20) 85.42 (78.45) 88.22 (80.15) 79.70 (68.62) 91.50 (68.50) 95.60 (68.75) 100.00 (70.75)
4 vs 6 92.61 (82.05) 93.63 (80.55) 83.20 (76.20) 87.62 (79.90) 76.80 (68.25) 91.10 (71.38) 96.40 (73.31) 100.00 (77.06)
4 vs 7 90.97 (82.80) 93.21 (80.90) 84.64 (78.45) 89.00 (82.70) 83.50 (71.19) 92.20 (71.62) 96.50 (68.19) 100.00 (73.69)
4 vs 8 94.35 (91.40) 95.86 (90.70) 93.13 (88.65) 95.15 (91.25) 97.50 (90.69) 97.80 (90.75) 97.70 (89.19) 100.00 (91.62)
4 vs 9 97.67 (92.60) 97.33 (90.55) 93.21 (88.65) 95.67 (92.60) 97.60 (88.00) 97.00 (86.69) 98.20 (87.44) 100.00 (89.50)
5 vs 6 94.08 (84.20) 93.14 (81.85) 86.01 (80.30) 89.55 (84.50) 78.30 (65.12) 88.70 (65.50) 96.10 (61.75) 100.00 (66.69)
5 vs 7 90.73 (82.85) 92.64 (80.80) 84.78 (76.70) 88.55 (82.80) 75.40 (62.94) 90.50 (64.81) 95.60 (59.88) 100.00 (64.25)
5 vs 8 98.73 (92.05) 97.65 (90.20) 92.84 (88.50) 96.59 (92.10) 94.50 (91.81) 96.00 (91.44) 97.90 (89.88) 100.00 (91.56)
5 vs 9 96.77 (90.75) 96.52 (89.00) 91.59 (86.70) 95.17 (91.00) 92.70 (87.06) 95.60 (85.94) 97.70 (87.00) 100.00 (88.38)
6 vs 7 96.95 (91.30) 97.60 (89.45) 91.22 (86.40) 94.39 (89.75) 83.00 (70.56) 93.90 (70.81) 96.60 (65.50) 100.00 (72.62)
6 vs 8 98.33 (94.85) 98.36 (93.95) 96.16 (92.70) 97.82 (95.05) 96.40 (91.50) 98.40 (90.94) 97.80 (90.12) 100.00 (90.62)
6 vs 9 99.10 (93.25) 97.89 (90.90) 93.99 (90.15) 96.69 (93.20) 95.70 (86.31) 95.80 (85.69) 97.10 (85.19) 100.00 (87.25)
7 vs 8 97.79 (92.40) 98.23 (90.95) 93.97 (88.95) 96.46 (92.55) 97.60 (91.62) 97.50 (91.31) 97.20 (89.94) 100.00 (92.38)
7 vs 9 96.76 (89.50) 96.28 (87.35) 90.64 (85.70) 93.84 (89.45) 95.10 (87.38) 96.40 (86.69) 97.10 (85.00) 100.00 (89.50)
8 vs 9 95.52 (86.95) 95.89 (86.10) 90.46 (83.15) 92.82 (87.10) 89.60 (74.31) 94.80 (75.06) 96.10 (75.94) 100.00 (77.25)
binary representation of the activation value of 0 and 1, the model performance is
slightly reduced (approximately equal to 2). MLP-01-SCD has the worst performance,
with a performance loss of about 4. We were considering the difficulty of optimization
of zero-one loss and the binary representation of the middle layer. This performance
loss is acceptable considering that training a undifferentiable neural network with
non-convex loss by gradient-free method is much harder than training a differentiable
network by back-propagation.
In the performance part, we pick MLP-BCE-BP’s accuracy in each class pair
as baseline, compare the other three models’ accuracy to MLP-BCE-BP’s, and
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Table 3.5 Summary Results of MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD,
MLP-BCE-SCD on CIFAR10 and STL10, Each Model is a Ensembling of Eight Votes
Accuracy (mean of all 45 pairs)
Dataset Model mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
CIFAR10
Train 94.2 94.88 88.6 92.4
Test 87.2 85.42 83.2 86.8
STL10
Train 89.26 94.1 97.02 100
Test 79.65 79.46 78.42 81.17
Performance (mlpbcebp is the baseline)
Dataset Model mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
CIFAR10
Train 100.00% 102.34% 94.18% 97.77%
Test 100.00% 96.86% 94.10% 98.57%
STL10
Train 100.00% 103.58% 104.45% 108.46%
Test 100.00% 100.92% 98.77% 103.54%
Runtime (seconds)
Dataset #Samples mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
CIFAR10 10000 40 46 64 56
STL10 1600 34 39 17.46 17.3
then average the percentage. We can see under the same activation (MLP-01-SCD
compared to MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-BCE-SCD compared to MLP-BCE-BP), the
performance of models optimized by SCD is about 1% − 3% different from models
optimized by SGD.
In the runtime part, SCD algorithm takes a longer time to train on the CIFAR10
dataset than SGD algorithm, but much faster in the STL10 dataset. The reason is
that SCD always performs better with bigger batch size and more data cost longer
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in computing. STL10 dataset contains only 1600 samples in each subset, which is
smaller than 10000 samples in each subset in CIFAR10.
3.4 Conclusion
This study shows a novel Stochastic Coordinate Descent (SCD) method to optimize
the zero-one loss function. In practice, a fixed step size plus weight normalization
method adjusts the rotation angle of the hyperplane. In addition, the setting of the
feature pool can reduce the number of coordinates to be filtered, and the interval
can help to avoid redundant projection calculations. These modifications can save
calculating time and memory in multi-core parallel operations, and will not cause
excessive adverse effects on the final performance. Finally, we verified the actual
performance of SCD on multiple image data sets and analyzed the impact of different
hyperparameters on training. Objectively speaking, the shortcomings of SCD are
more prominent. As the data dimension increases, SCD often requires many more
iterations to achieve convergence.
Comparing with SGD, our implementation has not been deeply optimized, and
its running time is longer than SGD. We only verified the performance of SCD on the
shallow model network, which does not mean that it can be perfectly applied to the
deep network model. As the network model deepens, the local minimum problem of
zero-one loss will become more significant. Sign activation is not sensitive to input
changes, zero-one loss is challenging to optimize (in the case of no data points passing
through the hyperplane, whether the changed hyperplane is better or worse cannot
be reflected in zero-one loss, but the cross entropy can). In addition, we only change
one coordinate each time, which means the change of the output feature may not
necessarily affect the subsequent network layer, when training a certain layer of the
network. In other words, as the network deepens, SCD is very likely to fall into a
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particular local minimum and not able to escape. Solving this series of problem is
the key to applying SCD to deep neural networks successfully.
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CHAPTER 4
OPTIMIZING CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORKS BY
STOCHASTIC COORDINATE DESCENT
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Convolutional Neural Network
A convolutional neural network is an extended form of multiple layers perceptron,
which is a representative neural network architecture of deep learning [27, 29]. The
research on convolutional neural networks began in the 1980s and 1990s. Time delay
neural networks and LeNet-5 were the earliest convolutional neural networks [37].
After the twentieth century, with the introduction of deep learning theory and the
use of enormous computing resources, brain neural networks have been developed
rapidly and widely used in computer vision and natural language processing [29].
In general, the hidden layers of convolutional neural networks include convolu-
tional layers, pooling layers, and fully connected layers [38]. Modern algorithms may
contain residual layers, inception, and other more complex structures [30, 55].
The convolutional layer aims at extracting features from the input data. It
contains multiple convolution kernels. Each convolution kernel contains a weight
coefficient and a bias vector, similar to a neuron in a feedforward neural network.
Each kernel in the convolutional layer connects to multiple kernels in a region close
to the previous layer. The region’s size depends on the size of the convolution kernel,
which is called the ”receptive field” which is compared to the receptive field of visual
cortex cells in the literature [29]. The convolution kernel will scan the input features
regularly, do matrix element multiplication and summation of the input features in
the receptive field and superimpose the deviation [27].
Subsequent to feature extraction in the convolutional layer, the output feature
map will be passed to the pooling layer for feature selection and information filtering.
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The pooling layer contains a preset pooling function, whose function is to replace
the result of a single point in the feature map with the feature map statistics of its
neighboring regions. The pooling layer selects the pooling area in the same steps as
the convolution kernel scanning feature map, which is controlled by the pooling size,
step size, and padding [27, 31, 19, 8].
The fully connected layer in the convolutional neural network is equivalent to
the hidden layer in the traditional feedforward neural network. The fully connected
layer is located at the last part of the hidden layer of the convolutional neural network
and only transmits signals to other fully connected layers. The feature map will lose
the spatial topology in the fully connected layer and will be expanded into a vector
and passed through the activation function [29].
4.1.2 Training Convolutional Neural Network
Although the primary strategy of applying Stochastic Coordinate Descent (SCD)
to Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and MLP does not differ a lot, it is still
optimized layer by layer, optimizing one node at a time. However, the shared weight
mechanism of CNN and the deeper network structure will significantly impact the
original SCD algorithm, mainly focusing on massive optional biases, which results
to a substantial increase in calculation volume. Furthermore, more layers of sign
activation layers would cause the loss at the back of the network not responding to




Figure 4.1 shows an example of the structure of the Sign activation convolutional
neural network. This structure consists of three convolutional blocks in which there is
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Figure 4.1 CNN01 architecture for image classification.
a convolutional kernel and an average pooling layer. A fully connected layer followed
the last convolutional block, then an output layer. When the image data passes
through the first convolution module, the convolution kernel scans the entire image
and outputs real-number features. After passing sign activation, the feature consists of
binary values of 0 and 1 only and then feeds into the pooling layer for down-sampling.
After passing through the second and third convolution modules, the features already
contain the high-level semantics of the input image. Finally, after being reshaped into
a flatten vector, the features go through the fully connected layer and then generate
the final prediction. The whole process is no different from being in a typical CNN.
4.2.2 Multiple Phases Training And Temporary Linearization
Directly applying the original training strategy to CNN will easily fall into a local
minimum, and this negative effect will gradually become apparent as the network
deepens. Therefore, how to solve this problem has become the key to applying SCD
to deep neural networks. Our solution is to follow an earlier autoencoder training
method and train the network layer by layer. For the training of the deep model,
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the BP algorithm is usually used to update the network parameters. However, the
network weights need to be initialized very carefully to prevent the network from
falling into a local minimum during the training [54]. Of course, there are already
many ways to initialize network weights or other deep neural network processing
techniques such as ReLU activation function, Batch Normalization, and Residual
Connection, which can avoid the network falling into a local minimum in the training
process or gradient vanishing and degrading problems [55, 30].
No Bias The SCD Algorithm 2 described in the previous chapter mentioned that
when we update a node, whenever we obtain a new batch or update to coordinate
candidates, the bias should be re-calculated based on all unique projections in that
node. Therefore, the time complexity of obtaining bias is O(N), where N is the
number of samples in the batch. However, in calculating the convolution kernel, the
number of unique projections that appear is related to the output feature dimension in
the kernel. Therefore, the time complexity of obtaining the bias will become O(NK),
where K is the output dimension in each kernel. When the batch size remains the
same, the time complexity will be expanded by K times. For example, in a simple
CNN designed for CIFAR10 dataset (image size is 32∗32∗3), the output dimension of
the first convolutional layer (with 16 convolution kernels) is N ∗32∗32∗16. Regardless
of repeated projection values, the number of candidate bias is 32 ∗ 32 = 1024 times
more than the first layer of MLP. When the input image size is larger, each layer’s
feature dimension will also increase. Therefore, the time cost to calculate the bias
will greatly increase. In training, we constantly reduce the amount of calculation and
save space by not including bias. Through experimental observations, even if there
is no bias in CNN, the impact on the final model performance is very small, and the
accuracy loss is < 0.5%.
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Figure 4.2 Three phase training for CNN01. toy3srr100, toy3ssr100, toy3sss100
are models’ name in each phase. In the first phase, model’s weights are initialized
randomly, in the other phases, the model will load weights from previous phase.
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Multi-phase Training and Switch Activation Figure 4.2 shows the process of
training a convolutional neural network in three phases. This network is designed
for training on the CIFAR10 dataset. It includes three convolution modules, each
of which contains three components: a convolution layer, an activation function,
and a pooling layer. Passing through the last convolutional module and then a fully
connected layer, the last layer finally outputs predicted probabilities for each category.
In the first stage, only the first convolutional layer uses Sign activation, and all other
layers use ReLU activation. The weights of all layers are randomly initialized. Then
the network is trained by SCD in reverse order, from the output layer to the first
layer. The main goal of this phase is to train the Sign activated layer, the first layer.
Once the loss is converged, the activation function ReLU in the second layer will be
changed to Sign. Since the first layer has been trained in the previous stage, it is not
involved in training in this second stage. The goal of the second stage is to train the
second layer. The training process of the third stage is similar to that of the second
stage. The activation function of the third layer will be changed to Sign, and then the
second layer trained previously is also frozen in the current round. Since we found that
if we set Sign activation in the fully connected layer, the model’s overall performance
will drop significantly, so the ReLU activation function of the fully connected layer
is retained. After three phases of training, we will get a trained convolutional neural
network, toy3sss100 with three Sign activated convolutional layers. This training
strategy will greatly improve the performance compared to the method of directly
training the same structure, as Figure 4.3 shows. Since we will freeze the trained
layers in the later stages, the training time required in the later stages will be greatly
reduced.
Learning Rate Different from using the same learning rate for each layer when
training MLP, we found that in CNN training, as the training iteration increases, it
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Figure 4.3 Accuracy curve of three-phase training strategy compared to directly
training strategy on CIFAR10 dataset. X-axis is iteration or seconds, Y-axis is
accuracy.
Figure 4.4 Accuracy curve of different batch size setting in three-phase training
strategy. X-axis is iteration or seconds, Y-axis is accuracy.
is better to use a lower learning rate. This situation is similar to conducting learning
rate decay in Backpropagation to obtain lower loss. In SCD training, there are two
main learning rate adjustment strategies: 1. We try different learning rates on models
in each training phase and choose the best one as the final model. 2. Following the
strategy of learning rate decay, we halve the learning rate after a certain number of
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iterations. The result is shown in the Figure 4.3. It would be better to apply a fixed
learning rate at each stage than the learning rate decay strategy.
Batch Size As shown in the Figure 4.4, a model trained with a larger batch size
results in a higher accuracy. But considering that a larger batch size will bring a huge
memory workload and longer training time, we will not always use a large batch size
in actual training. Here we have a strategy: every time 3000 iterations are passed,
the batch size would be doubled. The batch size resets at the beginning of each stage.
In a single-stage with only 15000 iterations, we increase the batch size by up to 8
times, located at 3000th, 6000th, 9000th, and 12000th, respectively. This strategy
can significantly reduce training time. Its success is because the small batch size can
serve as a warm start, and the larger batch size is used to break the convergence
bottleneck of the small batch size training.
4.2.3 Additional Backpropagation Penetration (ABP)
Although multi-phase training can relieve symptoms of SCD search falling into the
local minimum during training multi-layer convolutional neural networks, the extra
training volume greatly extends the training time. In addition, changing only one
coordinate in later layers at a time makes loss finitely propagating back to the current
trained layer. Considering that backpropagation is an effective training method, we
add backpropagation into multi-stage training to better pass the loss back to the
previous layer. We call this method Additional Backpropagation Penetration.
Process The entire process of additional backpropagation penetration (ABP) is
partially similar to the multi-stage training. A three-phase ABP process is shown in
the Figure 4.5. In the first stage, all layers’ weights are initialized randomly. The
first convolutional layer uses Sign activation, and all subsequent layers use ReLU
activation. In each iteration, firstly cross-entropy loss for the second to fifth layers by
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Figure 4.5 Three phase ABP training for CNN01. toy3srr100, toy3ssr100,
toy3sss100 are models’ name in each phase.
backpropagation is optimized, then the loss function is reset to zero-one loss and the
first layer is updated through SCD. After meeting the training iteration threshold,
the second stage begins, and the first layer will no longer participate in subsequent
training phases. In the second stage, the activation function of the second layer is
changed to Sign, and the weight of that layer is reinitialized. In each iteration, we
would use backpropagation to update the third to fifth layers and use SCD to update
the second layer. In the third stage, the second layer is frozen, and the third layer’s
activation function is set to Sign. Backpropagation is applied to update the fourth to
fifth layers and SCD is utilized to optimize the third layer. After these three stages
are completed, we get the final model, toy3sss100.
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Figure 4.6 Two independent data samplers for ABP training process.
Independent Data Sampler As Figure 4.6 shows, there are two independent data
samplers in ABP training process, which is different from general multi-phase training
mentioned above. One sampler is responsible for feeding data for ReLU layers during
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) backpropagation, and the other one provides
data for Sign layers during Stochastic Coordinate Descent (SCD) optimization.
For the SGD backpropagation part, additional data augmentation methods like
mirror flipping and random cropping will be included in the data processing. Data
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augmentation is an effective way of data processing to avoid the overfitting problem
while training deep convolutional neural networks, enabling the model to achieve
much higher level of accuracy in the test dataset. However, data augmentation can
not be as beneficial to our SCD algorithm currently as SGD can, so we only apply
data augmentation in the data sampler in SGD part.
Re-initialization Weights In the ABP training process, we consistently re-
initialize the weights in layers with ReLU activation in the SGD backpropagation
part, as Figure 4.5 shows. In general multi-phase training, we don’t re-initialize the
weights because we use SCD to optimize the whole neural network. Even though the
optimized weights do not work after switching the activation function from ReLU
to Sign, pre-trained weights work better than random initialization. To avoid the
situation that SGD gives similar mapping for the later layers, we would initialize
all layers, where SGD will optimize at the beginning of each round. This operation
would not affect regular training for accuracy but will affect the transferability of the
adversaries during adversary attacks.
4.2.4 Multiple Classes Classification
It is a huge challenge to apply zero-one loss to multi-classification tasks directly. zero-
one loss can only reflect the error rate of a hyperplane but cannot indicate the distance
of a misclassified point from the hyperplane like Cross Entropy does. Therefore, in the
optimization process, multiple classifications will bring more local minima than binary
classification. We cannot apply zero-one loss directly to the last layer as the final
loss function in a multi-class classification task. But we can intergrate zero-one loss
into multi-stage training. While applying Additional Backpropagation Penetration
(ABP), we use zero-one loss as the loss function to train the Sign activation layer
with SCD. However, We switch the loss function back to Cross-Entropy to train the




CIFAR10 “The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60000 32x32 colour images in 10
classes, with 6000 images per class. There are 50000 training images and 10000 test
images. The dataset is divided into five training batches and one test batch, each
with 10000 images. The test batch contains exactly 1000 randomly-selected images
from each class. The training batches contain the remaining images in random order,
but some training batches may contain more images from one class than another.
Between them, the training batches contain exactly 5000 images from each class”.
1[35].
STL10 “The STL-10 dataset is an image recognition dataset for developing
unsupervised feature learning, deep learning, self-taught learning algorithms. It is
inspired by the CIFAR-10 dataset but with some modifications. In particular, each
class has fewer labeled training examples than in CIFAR-10, but a very large set of
unlabeled examples is provided to learn image models prior to supervised training.
The primary challenge is to make use of the unlabeled data (which comes from
a similar but different distribution from the labeled data) to build a useful prior.
We also expect that the higher resolution of this dataset (96x96) will make it a
challenging benchmark for developing more scalable unsupervised learning methods.
[13].10 classes: airplane, bird, car, cat, deer, dog, horse, monkey, ship, truck. Images
are 96x96 pixels, color. 500 training images (10 pre-defined folds), 800 test images
per class. 100000 unlabeled images for unsupervised learning. These examples are
extracted from a similar but broader distribution of images. For instance, it contains
other types of animals (bears, rabbits, etc.) and vehicles (trains, buses, etc.) in
1see https://www.cs.toronto.edu/ kriz/cifar.html
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addition to the ones in the labeled set. Images were acquired from labeled examples
on ImageNet”.[15] 2
4.3.2 Models
We built an eight layers convolutional neural network (CNN) for CIFAR10 and a ten
layers convolutional neural network “CNN-01-ABP” for STL10 as baseline models.
Our algorithm focuses on solving binary classification problems, so we split the 10
class datasets into sub-datasets composed of two classes in each of CIFAR10 and
STL10. In other words, each dataset has a total of 45 sub-datasets. In addition,
we also trained a ReLU activation CNN “CNN-BCE-BP” optimized by stochastic
gradient descent, a Sign activation CNN “CNN-BCE-BAN” optimized by using an
approximated gradient methods to evaluate our performance algorithm. Training
details listed in Table 4.2. Image data will be scaled to range [0, 1] by divided by
255.
CNN-BCE-BP is a standard convolutional neural network, using ReLU
activation for each layer, binary cross-entropy as loss function, optimization method
is Stochastic Gradient descent. Parameters list in Table 4.1.
CNN-BCE-BAN is a convolutional neural network, using Sign activation for
convolutional layer and ReLU for fully connected layer, binary cross-entropy as loss
function, optimization method is Stochastic Gradient descent. Because sign activation
is non-differentiable, we approximate the gradient like linear activation, but clip the
gradient if the activation projection value more than quarter of mean in this batch.
Parameters list in Table 4.1.
CNN-01-ABP is a convolutional neural network, using Sign activation for






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































optimization method is stochastic coordinate descent with additional backpropagation
penetration. Parameters list in Table 4.1.
4.3.3 Comparison
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the accuracy of the three basic models in the 45 subgroups
of CIFAR10 and STL10. Table 4.5 summarizes the results and compares the
performance of the benchmark model with CNN-BCE-BP. Compared to Table 3.5,
all version of CNN achieve much higher accuracy than MLP in both CIFAR10 and
STL10 datasets.
We can see that CNN-BCE-BP has the best performance in CIFAR10.
After replacing ReLU in convolutional modules in the network with Sign, the
accurate gradient cannot be obtained due to non-differentiable activation function.
Backpropagation cannot be used directly to solve the optimization problem accurately,
but the approximate gradient can be obtained instead. Limited by the binary repre-
sentation of the activation value of 0 and 1, the model performance is slightly reduced
(approximately equal to 0.6%). The performance of the equivalent structure network
(CNN-01-ABP) optimized by SCD with Additional Backpropagation Penetration
(ABP) is very close to the benchmark model, and the performance loss is as small
as 0.8%, compared to CNN-BCE-BAN, the model optimized by backpropagation
with approximating gradient, the accuracy is only 0.2% lower. This reaveals that
SCD does not only work in MLP structure, it could also achieve the same level
accuracy in convolutional neural network, a deeper neural network structure. In
STL10, CNN-01-ABP’s average accuracy is 1.5% lower than CNN-BCE-BP’s.
In the performance part, we pick CNN-BCE-BP’s accuracy in each class pair
as a baseline, compare the other three models’ accuracy to CNN-BCE-BP’s, and
then average the percentage. We can see under the same activation (”CNN-01-ABP”














































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3 Training Accuracy (Testing Accuracy) of CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-
BAN, CNN-01-ABP on CIFAR10 and STL10, Each Model is a Ensembling of Eight
Votes (A)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP
0 vs 1 98.23 (97.60) 98.00 (96.90) 99.78 (96.45) 100.00 (94.88) 99.90 (95.00) 100.00 (94.38)
0 vs 2 94.39 (92.35) 93.58 (92.75) 99.08 (92.05) 100.00 (95.00) 99.80 (95.50) 100.00 (93.81)
0 vs 3 97.09 (96.00) 96.42 (95.70) 99.87 (95.55) 99.80 (98.19) 99.90 (97.81) 100.00 (97.06)
0 vs 4 97.15 (96.35) 96.89 (96.10) 99.92 (95.80) 100.00 (98.19) 99.80 (97.81) 100.00 (97.19)
0 vs 5 97.95 (97.10) 97.71 (96.80) 99.96 (96.70) 99.90 (98.12) 100.00 (98.50) 100.00 (97.56)
0 vs 6 98.12 (98.05) 97.83 (97.65) 99.98 (97.85) 99.90 (98.62) 100.00 (98.94) 100.00 (97.75)
0 vs 7 97.84 (96.45) 97.22 (96.65) 99.96 (96.20) 99.70 (98.81) 99.80 (98.88) 100.00 (98.31)
0 vs 8 96.63 (94.35) 94.71 (93.25) 99.48 (92.85) 99.90 (93.38) 100.00 (92.50) 100.00 (89.44)
0 vs 9 96.95 (95.55) 96.50 (94.90) 99.80 (95.10) 99.90 (94.12) 99.60 (94.25) 100.00 (92.75)
1 vs 2 98.81 (98.35) 98.67 (98.60) 99.98 (98.25) 100.00 (97.12) 100.00 (96.94) 100.00 (96.00)
1 vs 3 98.40 (97.70) 98.65 (97.95) 99.96 (97.00) 100.00 (86.44) 99.90 (82.44) 100.00 (83.69)
1 vs 4 99.08 (98.70) 99.23 (98.85) 100.00 (98.75) 100.00 (92.12) 99.70 (90.38) 100.00 (88.31)
1 vs 5 98.81 (98.50) 99.23 (99.05) 99.99 (98.45) 99.90 (89.94) 99.90 (88.56) 100.00 (86.81)
1 vs 6 98.77 (98.85) 98.75 (98.55) 99.97 (98.55) 99.90 (94.50) 99.90 (93.62) 100.00 (93.12)
1 vs 7 99.25 (98.95) 99.17 (99.05) 100.00 (98.60) 99.90 (89.44) 99.50 (87.94) 100.00 (85.94)
1 vs 8 97.61 (97.35) 97.35 (96.85) 99.90 (95.40) 100.00 (96.88) 100.00 (97.69) 100.00 (97.00)
1 vs 9 96.13 (94.25) 95.04 (94.10) 99.21 (92.65) 100.00 (96.62) 99.80 (96.56) 100.00 (95.44)
2 vs 3 91.91 (88.65) 89.45 (86.80) 99.05 (87.55) 100.00 (97.25) 100.00 (97.56) 100.00 (96.56)
2 vs 4 93.84 (90.65) 90.26 (87.30) 98.46 (87.95) 100.00 (97.25) 100.00 (98.00) 100.00 (97.19)
2 vs 5 93.41 (90.90) 91.25 (88.85) 99.28 (89.80) 99.60 (97.69) 100.00 (98.06) 100.00 (97.12)
2 vs 6 93.98 (93.25) 92.55 (91.25) 99.07 (92.25) 100.00 (97.00) 100.00 (97.19) 100.00 (96.31)
2 vs 7 95.52 (93.60) 94.56 (92.75) 99.73 (93.60) 100.00 (98.12) 100.00 (98.50) 100.00 (97.75)
2 vs 8 97.96 (96.95) 97.33 (96.45) 99.97 (96.25) 100.00 (95.00) 100.00 (94.88) 100.00 (94.25)
2 vs 9 98.08 (97.45) 98.33 (97.40) 99.93 (96.85) 100.00 (89.50) 99.90 (90.19) 100.00 (88.44)
about 0.4% − 0.5% lower than models optimized by SGD. This indicate that multi-
phase training with ABP redeem the weakness of SCD in training a deep neural
network.
In the runtime part, we see SCD algorithm takes much longer to train the same
network than backpropagation. The main reason is we need to train the network layer
by layer in multi-phase training, time complexity increase as the network structure
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Table 4.4 Training Accuracy (Testing Accuracy) of CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-
BAN, CNN-01-ABP on CIFAR10 and STL10, Each Model is a Ensembling of Eight
Votes (B)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP
2 vs 9 98.08 (97.45) 98.33 (97.40) 99.93 (96.85) 100.00 (89.50) 99.90 (90.19) 100.00 (88.44)
3 vs 4 93.18 (91.70) 91.82 (90.05) 99.27 (89.95) 98.90 (85.12) 100.00 (84.81) 100.00 (81.44)
3 vs 5 87.58 (83.25) 79.97 (78.65) 96.51 (78.80) 99.50 (80.44) 99.50 (80.56) 100.00 (76.50)
3 vs 6 92.89 (91.90) 91.75 (91.20) 98.72 (92.10) 100.00 (93.38) 100.00 (92.38) 100.00 (91.38)
3 vs 7 95.23 (93.00) 94.10 (92.20) 99.45 (92.35) 99.40 (83.75) 99.70 (84.38) 100.00 (80.06)
3 vs 8 97.82 (96.80) 97.39 (96.90) 99.98 (96.70) 99.80 (97.75) 100.00 (97.56) 100.00 (97.31)
3 vs 9 97.44 (96.40) 97.95 (97.00) 99.77 (95.65) 99.80 (96.12) 99.80 (96.50) 100.00 (95.62)
4 vs 5 93.92 (92.50) 92.02 (90.10) 99.14 (91.30) 99.70 (86.50) 99.90 (84.75) 100.00 (84.62)
4 vs 6 95.93 (94.45) 95.04 (94.50) 99.70 (92.95) 99.90 (90.56) 99.60 (90.38) 100.00 (88.94)
4 vs 7 94.52 (92.10) 92.72 (91.20) 99.07 (91.60) 99.30 (89.06) 100.00 (87.31) 100.00 (86.06)
4 vs 8 98.44 (97.65) 97.98 (97.50) 100.00 (97.30) 100.00 (98.12) 100.00 (98.00) 100.00 (97.75)
4 vs 9 98.78 (98.40) 98.47 (97.80) 99.98 (98.15) 100.00 (96.94) 99.90 (96.62) 100.00 (95.81)
5 vs 6 95.78 (94.90) 95.54 (94.60) 99.62 (94.40) 99.70 (85.50) 100.00 (83.81) 100.00 (81.31)
5 vs 7 94.67 (93.25) 92.87 (91.65) 99.57 (91.15) 99.50 (80.56) 99.70 (79.38) 100.00 (78.25)
5 vs 8 98.56 (97.70) 98.33 (97.60) 100.00 (97.40) 99.80 (98.50) 100.00 (98.44) 100.00 (97.81)
5 vs 9 97.89 (97.85) 98.44 (97.65) 99.93 (97.00) 100.00 (97.25) 99.90 (97.44) 100.00 (96.19)
6 vs 7 98.20 (97.35) 98.42 (97.90) 99.93 (97.35) 100.00 (91.00) 100.00 (90.12) 100.00 (89.19)
6 vs 8 98.70 (98.25) 98.63 (98.15) 100.00 (97.95) 99.80 (98.62) 100.00 (98.12) 100.00 (98.00)
6 vs 9 98.80 (98.85) 98.82 (98.55) 99.93 (98.30) 100.00 (96.62) 100.00 (96.50) 100.00 (95.81)
7 vs 8 99.03 (98.55) 98.52 (98.00) 100.00 (97.90) 99.90 (98.56) 100.00 (98.94) 100.00 (98.50)
7 vs 9 98.46 (98.00) 98.17 (97.90) 99.82 (96.95) 99.90 (97.62) 100.00 (97.88) 100.00 (96.44)
8 vs 9 97.28 (96.30) 97.18 (96.10) 99.89 (95.15) 99.90 (91.50) 99.90 (91.50) 100.00 (89.81)
becomes deeper. Except additional phase training, the SCD search implementation
is not optimized as good as Stochastic Gradient Descent overall.
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Table 4.5 Summary Results of CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN, CNN-01-ABP on
CIFAR10 and STL10, Each Model is a Ensembling of Eight Votes
Accuracy (mean of 45 pairs)
Dataset Model CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP
CIFAR10
Train 96.64 95.84 99.61
Test 95.49 94.88 94.69
STL10
Train 99.85 99.90 100.00
Test 93.73 93.40 92.20
Performance (CNN-BCE-BP is the baseline)
Dataset Model CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP
CIFAR10
Train 100.00% 99.77% 101.58%
Test 100.00% 99.28% 98.82%
STL10
Train 100.00% 99.90% 100.00%
Test 100.00% 100.13% 99.47%
Runtime (seconds)
Dataset #Samples CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP
CIFAR10 10000 226 242 4285
STL10 1600 269 312 5587
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4.4 Conclusion
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is an extension of Multiple Layers Perceptron to
deal with spatial information. CNN could avoid excessive parameters problems under
the shared weights mechanism compared to MLP when the network structure goes
deeper. Moreover, the square kernel helps extract spatial information from the image,
which is more effective and flexible than flattening the source image into a vector and
then feeding it into MLP. Training deep neural network is a big challenge, to overcome
gradient vanishing, exploring, and degrading problems, researchers developed ReLU,
Batch Normalization, Residual connections to make network can be trained easier.
Training deep sign activation neural network with gradient-free optimization
method will meet the similar problems as SGD did. Here, we proposed a multi-phase
methodand, which train the network layer by layer, and additional backpropagation
penetration strategy to solve the problem of that loss can not be passed back well
to the front layers. Through experiments on CIFAR10 and STL10 dataset, we
see our SCD algorithm assisted with training strategies above could achieve similar
accuracy compared to backpropagation. Unfortunately, only update one coordinate
each time and multple phases training makes training takes much longer than SGD,
and applying zero-one loss in multi-class classification is long way to go.




ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS OF ZERO ONE LOSS SIGN
ACTIVATED MODELS
5.1 Introduction
Ever since the first paper introducing the incredible power of adversary examples
was published, the adversarial robustness of machine learning models has gained
widespread attention. The attack methods originated from the gradient-based
white-box attacks, then developed to attacks searching minimum distortion and
black-box attacks based on adversary transferability. In order to evaluate the
adversarial robustness of our zero-one loss neural network, we applied Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) for white-box attacks
and evaluated the adversaries’ transferability among the same type of models and
between different types of models. In addition, we conducted minimun distortion
attack such as Decision Boundary Attack to get each model’s l2 minimum distance
between adversaries and clean data. Finally, we compared the adversarial robustness
difference between the zero-one loss neural network optimized by SCD and the
cross-entropy neural network optimized by SGD with the same structure.
5.2 White-box Attack
In a white-box setting, the users have access to all the information of the target neural
network, including its architecture, parameters, gradients. The users can make full
use of the network information to carefully craft adversarial examples. White-box
attacks have been extensively studied because the disclosure of model architecture
and parameters helps people understand the weakness of DNN models clearly, and it
can be analyzed mathematically. As stated by Tram’er et. al. [57], security against
white-box attacks is the property that we desire ML models to have. Commonly used
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white-box attack algorithm includes Biggio’s attack [5], L-BFGS attack [56], Fast
Gradient Sign Method [28], Deep Fool [43], Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
[47], Projected Gradient Descent Attack [36], Carlini & Wagner’s Attack, Ground
Truth Attack [10]. Furthermore, other lp attacks try finding the minimum distortion
to fool the model [53]. Here, we only introduce Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack, which we used in the experiments.
5.2.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
FGSM [28] is a one-step method introduced to rapidly generate adversarial examples.
The formulation is:
x′ = x+ εsign(∇xL(θ, x, y)) non-target
x′ = x− εsign(∇xL(θ, x, t)) target on t
(5.1)
For non-target attack, x is the source image. ε is the distortion value, we often set ε
as n
256
(n is pixel shifting value, 256 is the maximum value in RGB image). L is the
loss of the model on input x if the target is y, ∇xL(θ, x, y) is x’s gradient based on
the given loss, and we take the sign of the gradient times ε, and add it to x. Before
processing this, we will normalize x to a range of [0, 1]. After injection, we will clip
x′’s range into [0, 1] as well. + will let the distortion to make x move to a place
away from the class y’s region.(After moving, the L(θ, x, y) will increase.) For target
attack, we would replace target class t (the class we hope the model to predict the
x as) to y in the formula. And inverse the + to −, in order to let the x to move to
a place close to class t’s region. (After moving, the L(θ, x, t) will decrease.) Other
processes are the same as in untargeted attack. This formulation can be seen as a
one-step of gradient descent to solve the problem:
minimize L(θ, x′, t)
subject to ||x′ − x||∞ ≤ ε and x′ ∈ [0, 1]m
(5.2)
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The objective function in (5.2) searches the point which has the minimum loss value
to label t in x’s ε-neighbor ball, which is the location where model F is most likely to
predict it to the target class t. In this way, the one-step generated sample x′ is also
likely to fool the model. A toy example of adversarial attack is shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Targeted adversarial attack on multi-class linear classifier.
5.2.2 Results of FGSM Attacks on Baseline Models
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 shows our four baseline models’ performance on their adversaries
generated from the FGSM attack on CIFAR10 and STL10 datasets (test fold). The
number in parenthesis is the accuracy on test data and the number out of parenthesis
is the accuracy on the adversarial version of test data. For example, there are 2000
images in classes pair 0 vs. 1, and MLP-BCE-BP’s original accuracy in this pair is
90.75%. We do the FGSM attack for MLP-BCE-BP and generate adversary for each
image in this pair based on MLP-BCE-BP’s information, and then we get a total
number of 2000 adversaries. The MLP-BCE-BP’s accuracy on these 2000 adversaries
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Table 5.1 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
Accuracy on Adversaries (Accuracy on Clean Data) of Test Dataset of CIFAR10
and STL10 Generated by FGSM Attacks (ε = 16/255), Each Model is a Ensembling
of Eight Votes (A)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
0 vs 1 0.4 (90.75) 0.95 (87.90) 36.35 (85.40) 10.3 (89.45) 9 (81.19) 2.75 (81.94) 10.81 (80.19) 33.56 (84.06)
0 vs 2 0.05 (85.25) 0.15 (84.20) 49.05 (80.80) 2.15 (85.25) 13.81 (85.50) 3.5 (83.94) 15.75 (86.81) 39.87 (88.50)
0 vs 3 0.9 (90.35) 2.95 (88.45) 56.6 (85.55) 9.05 (88.95) 29 (85.13) 13.63 (84.88) 17.31 (84.81) 40.13 (86.81)
0 vs 4 0.3 (89.80) 0.5 (88.30) 42.95 (86.00) 4.6 (88.70) 37.75 (85.69) 14.44 (85.25) 20.81 (84.81) 43.94 (85.25)
0 vs 5 0.95 (90.90) 1.55 (89.25) 65.6 (86.30) 13.75 (90.65) 43.12 (85.38) 8.44 (84.81) 8.94 (85.81) 39.19 (87.94)
0 vs 6 0.85 (93.40) 5.6 (92.00) 51.45 (90.70) 17.6 (92.70) 22.5 (86.75) 9.19 (86.44) 20.13 (87.56) 41.62 (88.88)
0 vs 7 0.8 (90.25) 0.35 (88.20) 45.65 (85.40) 10.15 (89.65) 33.69 (87.56) 15.12 (87.38) 7.06 (88.19) 45.37 (90.50)
0 vs 8 0.05 (83.25) 0.05 (81.75) 19.5 (78.90) 1.95 (82.95) 17.94 (78.19) 1.19 (78.69) 12.31 (75.44) 30 (80.56)
0 vs 9 2.8 (88.55) 0.7 (85.05) 47.6 (84.85) 9.45 (87.25) 14.44 (81.50) 1.87 (80.69) 8.87 (83.38) 33.19 (84.38)
1 vs 2 1.05 (92.25) 1.45 (89.55) 39.95 (89.45) 19 (92.00) 15.62 (88.31) 21.06 (86.75) 20.06 (86.94) 42.37 (91.00)
1 vs 3 1.55 (91.10) 1.4 (89.45) 47.6 (87.35) 18.5 (91.15) 2.31 (65.06) 0.06 (66.56) 2.56 (64.75) 14.75 (67.00)
1 vs 4 1.1 (93.85) 0.9 (91.75) 40.2 (90.50) 23.05 (93.50) 11.75 (68.44) 0.19 (70.31) 9.69 (67.94) 14.56 (70.75)
1 vs 5 1.05 (93.10) 1.5 (90.35) 42.9 (88.10) 22.75 (92.50) 5.62 (62.94) 0.25 (64.06) 3.62 (63.69) 12 (64.75)
1 vs 6 0.8 (94.60) 2.5 (92.10) 41.1 (92.65) 28.25 (94.50) 3 (72.81) 0.19 (73.19) 7.37 (69.75) 20.31 (77.00)
1 vs 7 1.5 (92.65) 1.7 (89.80) 42.5 (88.50) 22.2 (92.55) 4.69 (63.06) 0.12 (62.69) 1.69 (61.13) 13.75 (63.50)
1 vs 8 2.3 (87.40) 0.7 (86.35) 46.7 (84.10) 7.45 (86.95) 17.25 (89.94) 10.81 (88.50) 30.88 (87.81) 46.37 (90.13)
1 vs 9 0.1 (77.50) 0 (76.20) 38.95 (70.75) 0.4 (76.60) 15.81 (87.50) 13.5 (85.63) 27.5 (85.63) 47.94 (88.69)
2 vs 3 0.45 (77.20) 1.5 (75.95) 18.95 (74.90) 1.35 (77.65) 8.94 (86.56) 18.63 (84.88) 33.25 (83.44) 41.06 (87.38)
2 vs 4 0.1 (74.25) 0 (72.90) 22.3 (66.65) 0.55 (73.40) 18.37 (89.13) 19.75 (87.44) 39.12 (88.75) 41.44 (90.00)
2 vs 5 0.25 (77.95) 0.35 (77.15) 23.8 (73.80) 1.4 (77.65) 12.87 (88.44) 19.81 (86.63) 34.13 (86.06) 45.19 (89.13)
2 vs 6 0.35 (83.20) 0.25 (81.65) 35.45 (76.90) 2.25 (82.25) 16.5 (88.63) 29 (87.13) 37.56 (86.13) 47 (88.75)
2 vs 7 0.05 (83.95) 0.2 (82.25) 29.35 (79.85) 1.85 (83.45) 18.44 (88.94) 30.06 (86.75) 33.12 (85.88) 42 (89.44)
2 vs 8 0.9 (91.65) 1.35 (90.65) 71.75 (86.95) 10.3 (91.75) 6.44 (81.88) 0.56 (81.38) 24.81 (82.94) 35.25 (84.94)
is 0.4%, more than 90% drops from the accuracy on clean data (90.75%). We do the
same thing for the other three models, MLP-BCE-BAN’s accuracy drops from 87.9%
to 0.95%, MLP-01-SCD’s accuracy drops from 85.4% to 36.35%, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
accuracy drops from 89.45% to 10.3%. We do the attack on all 45 pairs each from
both CIFAR10 and STL10 for the four baseline models and summary results in Tables
5.1 and 5.2.
Figure 5.2 shows the overall adversaries’ accuracy on each pair from CIFAR10
dataset. We can see that MLP-01-SCD (green line) performs much better than the
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Table 5.2 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
Accuracy on Adversaries (Accuracy on Clean Data) of Test Dataset of CIFAR10
and STL10 Generated by FGSM Attacks (ε = 16/255), Each Model is a Ensembling
of Eight Votes (B)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
2 vs 9 0.95 (91.80) 1.85 (89.80) 42.7 (89.35) 12.55 (91.85) 2.44 (70.31) 0 (70.50) 6.19 (67.75) 21.44 (69.88)
3 vs 4 0.2 (80.50) 0.45 (79.40) 26.9 (78.85) 2.7 (80.55) 2.56 (68.94) 0.06 (70.50) 1 (66.88) 11.63 (68.25)
3 vs 5 0.05 (65.20) 0.1 (63.50) 20.25 (62.60) 0.1 (65.70) 0.37 (59.69) 0 (60.25) 2.5 (56.88) 8.37 (58.94)
3 vs 6 0.55 (80.45) 0.3 (79.50) 32.05 (77.80) 2.15 (80.65) 2.25 (70.63) 0.12 (71.44) 14.37 (69.38) 17.81 (72.06)
3 vs 7 0.2 (83.10) 0.55 (81.90) 35.05 (79.25) 1.9 (83.05) 0.88 (64.81) 0 (65.81) 2.37 (59.38) 10.31 (63.38)
3 vs 8 2.2 (91.35) 3.2 (89.65) 70.5 (87.55) 14.9 (91.45) 26.62 (89.44) 25.06 (89.44) 48.69 (88.31) 41.44 (90.06)
3 vs 9 0.8 (90.25) 1.3 (87.75) 39.3 (84.55) 11.6 (88.85) 21.19 (86.75) 11.75 (84.88) 23.31 (85.38) 41.25 (87.63)
4 vs 5 0.8 (80.95) 1.3 (78.20) 22.1 (78.45) 4.9 (80.15) 22.25 (68.63) 0.94 (68.50) 4.69 (68.75) 19.25 (70.75)
4 vs 6 0.05 (82.05) 0.2 (80.55) 37.95 (76.20) 1.6 (79.90) 6.5 (68.25) 0.19 (71.38) 8.81 (73.31) 16.37 (77.06)
4 vs 7 0.1 (82.80) 0.2 (80.90) 22.7 (78.45) 2.85 (82.70) 2.62 (71.19) 0.44 (71.63) 10.25 (68.19) 18.63 (73.69)
4 vs 8 1.4 (91.40) 4.4 (90.70) 70.25 (88.65) 8.1 (91.25) 32.5 (90.69) 33.5 (90.75) 45.87 (89.19) 55.5 (91.63)
4 vs 9 1.15 (92.60) 1.95 (90.55) 44.85 (88.65) 13.95 (92.60) 15.5 (88.00) 15.31 (86.69) 26.56 (87.44) 44 (89.50)
5 vs 6 0.2 (84.20) 0.15 (81.85) 37.7 (80.30) 5.55 (84.50) 1.25 (65.13) 0.06 (65.50) 1.31 (61.75) 11.44 (66.69)
5 vs 7 0.05 (82.85) 0.05 (80.80) 40.25 (76.70) 1.2 (82.80) 2.37 (62.94) 0 (64.81) 4.37 (59.88) 9.44 (64.25)
5 vs 8 1.1 (92.05) 3.8 (90.20) 64.25 (88.50) 20 (92.10) 36.06 (91.81) 31.69 (91.44) 65.87 (89.88) 47.94 (91.56)
5 vs 9 1.15 (90.75) 2.5 (89.00) 74.1 (86.70) 15.15 (91.00) 23 (87.06) 14.5 (85.94) 25.5 (87.00) 46 (88.38)
6 vs 7 0.55 (91.30) 0.55 (89.45) 50.7 (86.40) 7.7 (89.75) 5.25 (70.56) 0.19 (70.81) 2 (65.50) 19.37 (72.63)
6 vs 8 3.25 (94.85) 5.85 (93.95) 84.75 (92.70) 25.2 (95.05) 30.56 (91.50) 23.38 (90.94) 69.75 (90.13) 53.31 (90.63)
6 vs 9 0.6 (93.25) 2.15 (90.90) 41.45 (90.15) 19.75 (93.20) 20.81 (86.31) 16.88 (85.69) 30.63 (85.19) 47.56 (87.25)
7 vs 8 1.75 (92.40) 2.25 (90.95) 70.35 (88.95) 12.45 (92.55) 27.69 (91.63) 26.87 (91.31) 55.94 (89.94) 54 (92.38)
7 vs 9 1.1 (89.50) 1.9 (87.35) 59.4 (85.70) 8.25 (89.45) 22.37 (87.38) 20.75 (86.69) 30.63 (85.00) 50.56 (89.50)
8 vs 9 0.35 (86.95) 0.75 (86.10) 44.25 (83.15) 5.9 (87.10) 5.56 (74.31) 0 (75.06) 8.62 (75.94) 21.75 (77.25)
others’ model, MLP-BCE-SCD (yellow line) is the second-best one. MLP-BCE-BP
and MLP-BCE-BAN’s accuracy are close to 0% for each pair. This indicated that the
model optimized by our Stochastic Coordinate Descent (SCD) algorithm could defend
the FGSM attack better than Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) in this structure
on CIFAR10 dataset.
Figure 5.3 shows the overall adversaries’ accuracy on each pair from STL10
dataset. The performance difference between SCD models and SGD models is not as
big as in the CIFAR10 dataset, but we can still see that SCD models perform better
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Figure 5.2 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
accuracy on adversaries of CIFAR10 generated by FGSM attack (ε = 16/255). X-axis
is classes pair, Y-axis is accuracy on adversaries.
than SGD models in most cases. MLP-01-SCD performs worse than SGD models
in some pairs, probably because the structure does not fit the data dimension. The
image’s dimension in STL10 is 27,648 (96×96×3), which is much bigger than the
image’s dimension, 3072 (32×32×3) in CIFAR10. The MLP structure with 20 nodes
is hard to handle this kind of big image, especially for MLP-01-SCD, whose activation
function is Sign. Nevertheless, in MLP-BCE-SCD, in which activation is ReLu, it
performs stably better than SGD models.
As we knew, Convolutional Neural Network is a much better structure than
Multiple Layers Perceptron in extracting spatial information from image data. So
we also evaluate our CNN baseline models’ performance on adversaries of CIFAR10
generated by FGSM attack, the results listed in Table 5.3. From Figure 5.4, we can
see FGSM is not powerful enough to attack CNN structure and make their accuracy
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Table 5.3 CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN, CNN-01-ABP’s Accuracy on
Adversaries (Accuracy on Clean Data) of Test Dataset of CIFAR10 Generated by
FGSM Attacks (ε = 16/255), Each Model is a Ensembling of Eight Votes
classes cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp classes cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp
0 vs 1 32.4 (97.60) 53.4 (96.90) 79.15 (96.45) 2 vs 9 22.25 (97.45) 50.35 (97.40) 77.65 (96.85)
0 vs 2 9.35 (92.35) 29.4 (92.75) 54.6 (92.05) 3 vs 4 4.8 (91.70) 15.25 (90.05) 43.35 (89.95)
0 vs 3 24.35 (96.00) 48 (95.70) 74.7 (95.55) 3 vs 5 0.35 (83.25) 2 (78.65) 16.7 (78.80)
0 vs 4 9.7 (96.35) 26.35 (96.10) 62 (95.80) 3 vs 6 5.3 (91.90) 18.1 (91.20) 45.05 (92.10)
0 vs 5 25.85 (97.10) 46.45 (96.80) 78 (96.70) 3 vs 7 2.05 (93.00) 8.05 (92.20) 38.05 (92.35)
0 vs 6 40.45 (98.05) 57.05 (97.65) 82.05 (97.85) 3 vs 8 28.15 (96.80) 46.4 (96.90) 80.25 (96.70)
0 vs 7 19.55 (96.45) 40.95 (96.65) 74.3 (96.20) 3 vs 9 13.65 (96.40) 40.8 (97.00) 67.35 (95.65)
0 vs 8 7.65 (94.35) 19.75 (93.25) 50.6 (92.85) 4 vs 5 9.85 (92.50) 16.95 (90.10) 48.4 (91.30)
0 vs 9 26.7 (95.55) 43.5 (94.90) 73.1 (95.10) 4 vs 6 1.75 (94.45) 8.3 (94.50) 42.1 (92.95)
1 vs 2 27.85 (98.35) 62 (98.60) 80.75 (98.25) 4 vs 7 1.65 (92.10) 8.6 (91.20) 40.2 (91.60)
1 vs 3 24.65 (97.70) 55.05 (97.95) 76.15 (97.00) 4 vs 8 21.3 (97.65) 48.75 (97.50) 74.2 (97.30)
1 vs 4 18.65 (98.70) 47.95 (98.85) 78.35 (98.75) 4 vs 9 16 (98.40) 47.05 (97.80) 74.35 (98.15)
1 vs 5 25.45 (98.50) 57.1 (99.05) 81.75 (98.45) 5 vs 6 9.55 (94.90) 19.05 (94.60) 50.35 (94.40)
1 vs 6 25.25 (98.85) 49.35 (98.55) 81.3 (98.55) 5 vs 7 2.15 (93.25) 7.45 (91.65) 41.95 (91.15)
1 vs 7 25.05 (98.95) 55.15 (99.05) 83.95 (98.60) 5 vs 8 41.1 (97.70) 54.2 (97.60) 83.35 (97.40)
1 vs 8 12.9 (97.35) 32.3 (96.85) 68.25 (95.40) 5 vs 9 22 (97.85) 45.95 (97.65) 75 (97.00)
1 vs 9 4.3 (94.25) 14.35 (94.10) 50.55 (92.65) 6 vs 7 7.45 (97.35) 28.3 (97.90) 62.05 (97.35)
2 vs 3 2.25 (88.65) 9.85 (86.80) 35.9 (87.55) 6 vs 8 40.5 (98.25) 59.05 (98.15) 83 (97.95)
2 vs 4 2.25 (90.65) 6.5 (87.30) 27.6 (87.95) 6 vs 9 19.55 (98.85) 39.8 (98.55) 77.1 (98.30)
2 vs 5 5.05 (90.90) 11.55 (88.85) 43.2 (89.80) 7 vs 8 26.05 (98.55) 53.95 (98.00) 82.25 (97.90)
2 vs 6 6.4 (93.25) 17.5 (91.25) 48.3 (92.25) 7 vs 9 12.6 (98.00) 39.45 (97.90) 73.75 (96.95)
2 vs 7 6.35 (93.60) 18.8 (92.75) 51.3 (93.60) 8 vs 9 15.65 (96.30) 31.95 (96.10) 67 (95.15)
2 vs 8 21.9 (96.95) 43.5 (96.45) 75.7 (96.25)
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Figure 5.3 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
accuracy on adversaries of STL10 generated by FGSM attack (ε = 16/255). X-axis
is classes pair, Y-axis is accuracy on adversaries.
drop to 0% on adversaries. Aleksander Madry [41] claims that FGSM is a one-time
attack method. That is, adding a gradient to data only increases the gradient once.
However, if the target is a complex nonlinear model, such a method may not be able to
attack successfully. Even though the FGSM is not a powerful attack on deep neural
networks or complicated models, we can also see that CNN-01-ABP performs more
robust than CNN-BCE-BP and CNN-BCE-BAN in all pairs. In the next section, we
introduce a stronger gradient-based white-box attack method, PGD attack.
5.2.3 Projected Gradient Descent
The Basic Iterative Method was first introduced by Alexey Kurakin [36]. It is an
iterative version of the one-step attack FGSM. In a non-targeted setting, it gives an
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Figure 5.4 CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN, CNN-01-ABP’s accuracy on adver-
saries of CIFAR10 generated by FGSM attack (ε = 16/255). X-axis is classes pair,
Y-axis is accuracy on adversaries.
iterative formulation to craft x′:
x0 = x
xt+1 = Clipx,ε(x
t + αsign(∇xL(θ, xt, y)))
(5.3)
Here, Clip restricts the function not passing the surface of x’s ε-neighbor ball
Bε(x) : {x′ : ||x′ − x||∞ ≤ ε}. The step size α usually is a small number (e.g. 1 unit
of pixel change for each step), and step numbers ensure that the distortion can reach
the border (e.g. step = 2×ε/α). Projected Gradient Method (PGD) is a variant of
BIM, where the distortion start from a random projection on x + θ, instead of the
original x [41].
PGD attempts to acquire a perturbation that enlarge the loss of a given model
on a specific data sample, while maintain the distortion smaller than a threshold ε.
62
Usually, to make sure the adversary looks imperceptibly different to humans, L2 or
L∞ norm of the distortion will be measured when it adds to the clean sample.
This PGD attack heuristically searches adversary x′ achieves largest loss value
without going out of the l∞ ball limitation. These “most-adversarial” examples are
most aggressive to fool the classifiers, when the perturbation intensity (its lp norm)
is limited. Finding these adversarial examples help researchers to figure out the
weaknesses of machine learning models.
5.2.4 Results of PGD Attacks on Baseline Models
Figure 5.5 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
accuracy on adversaries of CIFAR10 generated by PGD attack (ε = 16/255, α =
2/255, steps = 20). X-axis is classes pair, Y-axis is accuracy on adversaries.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 shows our four baseline models’ performance on their
adversaries generated from the PGD attack on CIFAR10 and STL10 datasets (test
fold). The number in parenthesis is the accuracy on test data and the number
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Table 5.4 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
Accuracy on Adversaries (Accuracy on Clean Data) of Test Dataset of CIFAR10
and STL10 Generated by PGD Attacks (ε = 16/255, α = 2/255, steps = 20), Each
Model is a Ensembling of Eight Votes (A)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
0 vs 1 0.4 (90.75) 0.1 (87.90) 26.9 (85.40) 0.15 (89.45) 3.12 (81.19) 1.25 (81.94) 0.19 (80.19) 0.25 (84.06)
0 vs 2 0 (85.25) 0 (84.20) 34.6 (80.80) 0 (85.25) 5.31 (85.50) 1.81 (83.94) 10.25 (86.81) 0.37 (88.50)
0 vs 3 0.25 (90.35) 0.5 (88.45) 45.6 (85.55) 0.4 (88.95) 15 (85.13) 10.44 (84.88) 5 (84.81) 0.19 (86.81)
0 vs 4 0.1 (89.80) 0.1 (88.30) 40.1 (86.00) 0 (88.70) 19.5 (85.69) 7.12 (85.25) 5.37 (84.81) 2.56 (85.25)
0 vs 5 0.1 (90.90) 0.05 (89.25) 57.4 (86.30) 0.6 (90.65) 24.94 (85.38) 7.69 (84.81) 1.81 (85.81) 0.19 (87.94)
0 vs 6 0.45 (93.40) 0.5 (92.00) 44.55 (90.70) 0.85 (92.70) 13.63 (86.75) 8.69 (86.44) 10.56 (87.56) 0.37 (88.88)
0 vs 7 0.15 (90.25) 0 (88.20) 34.7 (85.40) 0.55 (89.65) 18.25 (87.56) 14.94 (87.38) 1.69 (88.19) 0.62 (90.50)
0 vs 8 0 (83.25) 0 (81.75) 10.55 (78.90) 0 (82.95) 7.37 (78.19) 0.75 (78.69) 1.75 (75.44) 0.5 (80.56)
0 vs 9 0.65 (88.55) 0.1 (85.05) 36.05 (84.85) 0.25 (87.25) 5.75 (81.50) 1.81 (80.69) 2.94 (83.38) 0.12 (84.38)
1 vs 2 0.35 (92.25) 0.1 (89.55) 33.35 (89.45) 0.45 (92.00) 5 (88.31) 5.81 (86.75) 13.12 (86.94) 0.88 (91.00)
1 vs 3 0.4 (91.10) 0.05 (89.45) 30.2 (87.35) 0.15 (91.15) 0.25 (65.06) 0.06 (66.56) 0.06 (64.75) 0.12 (67.00)
1 vs 4 0.35 (93.85) 0 (91.75) 33.9 (90.50) 0.6 (93.50) 3.81 (68.44) 0 (70.31) 1.06 (67.94) 0 (70.75)
1 vs 5 0.55 (93.10) 0.25 (90.35) 33.95 (88.10) 0.6 (92.50) 2.31 (62.94) 0.06 (64.06) 0.12 (63.69) 0 (64.75)
1 vs 6 0.2 (94.60) 0.1 (92.10) 38.8 (92.65) 1.15 (94.50) 0.94 (72.81) 0.12 (73.19) 0.44 (69.75) 0.19 (77.00)
1 vs 7 0.15 (92.65) 0 (89.80) 29.4 (88.50) 0.35 (92.55) 2.25 (63.06) 0 (62.69) 0 (61.13) 0 (63.50)
1 vs 8 1 (87.40) 0.05 (86.35) 25.35 (84.10) 0.2 (86.95) 7.06 (89.94) 9.56 (88.50) 9.56 (87.81) 4 (90.13)
1 vs 9 0 (77.50) 0 (76.20) 12.3 (70.75) 0 (76.60) 6.25 (87.50) 7.56 (85.63) 17.56 (85.63) 4.37 (88.69)
2 vs 3 0.05 (77.20) 0.3 (75.95) 13.4 (74.90) 0.05 (77.65) 3.37 (86.56) 3.5 (84.88) 25.56 (83.44) 0 (87.38)
2 vs 4 0 (74.25) 0 (72.90) 8.45 (66.65) 0 (73.40) 8.44 (89.13) 4.69 (87.44) 23.12 (88.75) 0.06 (90.00)
2 vs 5 0.1 (77.95) 0 (77.15) 16.25 (73.80) 0.05 (77.65) 4.75 (88.44) 4 (86.63) 20.81 (86.06) 0.19 (89.13)
2 vs 6 0.05 (83.20) 0 (81.65) 19.55 (76.90) 0 (82.25) 4.69 (88.63) 6.88 (87.13) 27.31 (86.13) 0 (88.75)
2 vs 7 0 (83.95) 0 (82.25) 19.8 (79.85) 0.05 (83.45) 6.94 (88.94) 7.5 (86.75) 22.12 (85.88) 0.12 (89.44)
2 vs 8 0.3 (91.65) 0.05 (90.65) 44.1 (86.95) 0.05 (91.75) 0.94 (81.88) 0.12 (81.38) 17.62 (82.94) 0.25 (84.94)
out of parenthesis is the accuracy on the adversarial version of test data. For
example, there are 2000 images in classes pair 0 vs. 1, and MLP-BCE-BP’s original
accuracy in this pair is 90.75%. We do the PGD attack for MLP-BCE-BP and
generate adversary for each image in this pair based on MLP-BCE-BP’s information,
and then we get a total number of 2000 adversaries. The MLP-BCE-BP’s accuracy
on these 2000 adversaries is 0.4%, more than 90% drops from the accuracy on clean
data (90.75%). We do the same thing for the other three models, MLP-BCE-BAN’s
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Table 5.5 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
Accuracy on Adversaries (Accuracy on Clean Data) of Test Dataset of CIFAR10
and STL10 Generated by PGD Attacks (ε = 16/255, α = 2/255, steps = 20), Each
Model is a Ensembling of Eight Votes (B)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
2 vs 9 0.1 (91.80) 0.05 (89.80) 31.7 (89.35) 0.25 (91.85) 0.31 (70.31) 0 (70.50) 0.19 (67.75) 0.06 (69.88)
3 vs 4 0.05 (80.50) 0.05 (79.40) 19.1 (78.85) 0 (80.55) 0.31 (68.94) 0 (70.50) 0 (66.88) 0 (68.25)
3 vs 5 0 (65.20) 0 (63.50) 8.7 (62.60) 0 (65.70) 0.06 (59.69) 0 (60.25) 0 (56.88) 0 (58.94)
3 vs 6 0.3 (80.45) 0.05 (79.50) 22.1 (77.80) 0.05 (80.65) 0.44 (70.63) 0.12 (71.44) 0.12 (69.38) 0.44 (72.06)
3 vs 7 0.05 (83.10) 0.05 (81.90) 21.2 (79.25) 0.05 (83.05) 0.25 (64.81) 0 (65.81) 0 (59.38) 0 (63.38)
3 vs 8 1.05 (91.35) 0.15 (89.65) 48.6 (87.55) 0.2 (91.45) 13.88 (89.44) 11.19 (89.44) 9.44 (88.31) 2.31 (90.06)
3 vs 9 0.1 (90.25) 0.1 (87.75) 29.75 (84.55) 0.1 (88.85) 11.12 (86.75) 7.19 (84.88) 15.25 (85.38) 3.75 (87.63)
4 vs 5 0.05 (80.95) 0.35 (78.20) 17 (78.45) 0.4 (80.15) 13.88 (68.63) 0.37 (68.50) 0.56 (68.75) 1.12 (70.75)
4 vs 6 0 (82.05) 0.05 (80.55) 9.15 (76.20) 0 (79.90) 2.87 (68.25) 0.06 (71.38) 3.44 (73.31) 0.31 (77.06)
4 vs 7 0 (82.80) 0 (80.90) 16.6 (78.45) 0 (82.70) 1 (71.19) 0.31 (71.63) 2.19 (68.19) 0.69 (73.69)
4 vs 8 0.75 (91.40) 0.55 (90.70) 66.9 (88.65) 0.1 (91.25) 18.81 (90.69) 15.19 (90.75) 18.37 (89.19) 9.31 (91.63)
4 vs 9 0.2 (92.60) 0.05 (90.55) 35.9 (88.65) 0.15 (92.60) 8.56 (88.00) 2.94 (86.69) 21.12 (87.44) 3.37 (89.50)
5 vs 6 0.05 (84.20) 0.05 (81.85) 21.35 (80.30) 0.2 (84.50) 0.12 (65.13) 0.06 (65.50) 0 (61.75) 0.06 (66.69)
5 vs 7 0 (82.85) 0 (80.80) 14.2 (76.70) 0 (82.80) 0.69 (62.94) 0 (64.81) 0.12 (59.88) 0 (64.25)
5 vs 8 0.1 (92.05) 0.3 (90.20) 46.9 (88.50) 0.5 (92.10) 24.31 (91.81) 17 (91.44) 19.44 (89.88) 4.19 (91.56)
5 vs 9 0.35 (90.75) 0.1 (89.00) 67.95 (86.70) 0.1 (91.00) 15.25 (87.06) 5.37 (85.94) 18 (87.00) 4.12 (88.38)
6 vs 7 0.35 (91.30) 0.05 (89.45) 19.75 (86.40) 0.2 (89.75) 2.5 (70.56) 0.12 (70.81) 0.19 (65.50) 0.19 (72.63)
6 vs 8 0.25 (94.85) 0.8 (93.95) 72.75 (92.70) 0.85 (95.05) 22.5 (91.50) 9 (90.94) 15.06 (90.13) 5.62 (90.63)
6 vs 9 0.3 (93.25) 0.2 (90.90) 32.05 (90.15) 0.3 (93.20) 11.44 (86.31) 5.94 (85.69) 11.44 (85.19) 5.19 (87.25)
7 vs 8 0.4 (92.40) 0.25 (90.95) 44.45 (88.95) 0.25 (92.55) 14.69 (91.63) 15.25 (91.31) 19.31 (89.94) 7.25 (92.38)
7 vs 9 0.05 (89.50) 0.15 (87.35) 48.65 (85.70) 0 (89.45) 11.75 (87.38) 5.19 (86.69) 4.56 (85.00) 6.88 (89.50)
8 vs 9 0.1 (86.95) 0.15 (86.10) 29.75 (83.15) 0.15 (87.10) 1.62 (74.31) 0 (75.06) 4.5 (75.94) 0.12 (77.25)
accuracy drops from 87.9% to 0.1%, MLP-01-SCD’s accuracy drops from 85.4% to
26.9%, MLP-BCE-SCD’s accuracy drops from 89.45% to 0.15%. We do the attack
on all 45 pairs each from both CIFAR10 and STL10 for the four baseline models and
summary results in Table 5.4 and 5.5. Compared to Table 5.1 and 5.2, we can see the
overall accuracy on adversaries after PGD attack are lower than FGSM attack, this
means PGD attack is more powerful in non-linear classifier because of multiple steps
gradient is more accurate to approximate the target models’ decision boundary.
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Figure 5.6 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
accuracy on adversaries of STL10 generated by PGD attack (ε = 16/255, α =
2/255, steps = 20). X-axis is classes pair, Y-axis is accuracy on adversaries.
Figure 5.5 shows the overall adversaries’ accuracy on each pair from CIFAR10
dataset. We can see that MLP-01-SCD (green line) performs clearly better than the
others’ model. MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, and MLP-BCE-SCD’s accuracy are
close to 0% for each pair.
Figure 5.6 shows the overall adversaries’ accuracy on each pair from STL10
dataset. The performance difference between SCD models and SGD models is not as
big as in the CIFAR10 dataset. Overall speaking the MLP-01-SCD model’s robustness
is not bad.
In the previous section we see FGSM is not very effective in attacking CNN,
becasue one step attack can hardly attack structure with complicated non-linear
projection. After doing PGD attack for all four baseline models, all models’ accuracy
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Table 5.6 CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN, CNN-01-ABP’s Accuracy on
Adversaries (Accuracy on Clean Data) of Test Dataset of CIFAR10 Generated by
PGD Attacks (ε = 16/255, α = 2/255, steps = 20), Each Model is a Ensembling of
Eight Votes
classes cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp classes cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp
0 vs 1 6.95 (97.60) 8.7 (96.90) 19.95 (96.45) 2 vs 9 5.05 (97.45) 4.3 (97.40) 15.5 (96.85)
0 vs 2 0.7 (92.35) 2.1 (92.75) 2.85 (92.05) 3 vs 4 0.35 (91.70) 0.1 (90.05) 0.7 (89.95)
0 vs 3 6.85 (96.00) 10.25 (95.70) 15.05 (95.55) 3 vs 5 0 (83.25) 0 (78.65) 0 (78.80)
0 vs 4 1.15 (96.35) 1.3 (96.10) 3.4 (95.80) 3 vs 6 0.25 (91.90) 0.1 (91.20) 0.4 (92.10)
0 vs 5 6.9 (97.10) 7.4 (96.80) 14.15 (96.70) 3 vs 7 0.7 (93.00) 0.15 (92.20) 0.95 (92.35)
0 vs 6 11.05 (98.05) 21.45 (97.65) 15.9 (97.85) 3 vs 8 7.8 (96.80) 5.8 (96.90) 16.5 (96.70)
0 vs 7 6.45 (96.45) 11.6 (96.65) 15.8 (96.20) 3 vs 9 2.15 (96.40) 0.95 (97.00) 6.2 (95.65)
0 vs 8 1.05 (94.35) 0.75 (93.25) 1.4 (92.85) 4 vs 5 0.65 (92.50) 1.5 (90.10) 1.45 (91.30)
0 vs 9 6.5 (95.55) 8.3 (94.90) 15.65 (95.10) 4 vs 6 0 (94.45) 0 (94.50) 0.35 (92.95)
1 vs 2 8.65 (98.35) 10.55 (98.60) 22.3 (98.25) 4 vs 7 0.2 (92.10) 0.35 (91.20) 1 (91.60)
1 vs 3 6.45 (97.70) 6.25 (97.95) 14.95 (97.00) 4 vs 8 3.55 (97.65) 7.95 (97.50) 15.8 (97.30)
1 vs 4 6.2 (98.70) 5.5 (98.85) 15.35 (98.75) 4 vs 9 3.4 (98.40) 5.75 (97.80) 13.25 (98.15)
1 vs 5 5.75 (98.50) 5.8 (99.05) 16.6 (98.45) 5 vs 6 0.85 (94.90) 0.95 (94.60) 1.25 (94.40)
1 vs 6 7.1 (98.85) 5.05 (98.55) 12.4 (98.55) 5 vs 7 0.2 (93.25) 0.2 (91.65) 0.65 (91.15)
1 vs 7 8.3 (98.95) 5.5 (99.05) 14.65 (98.60) 5 vs 8 12.75 (97.70) 8.7 (97.60) 21.45 (97.40)
1 vs 8 1.9 (97.35) 2 (96.85) 8.7 (95.40) 5 vs 9 2.5 (97.85) 1.15 (97.65) 6.9 (97.00)
1 vs 9 0 (94.25) 0.05 (94.10) 0.45 (92.65) 6 vs 7 1 (97.35) 0.7 (97.90) 2.85 (97.35)
2 vs 3 0.35 (88.65) 0.3 (86.80) 0.5 (87.55) 6 vs 8 11.85 (98.25) 13.8 (98.15) 23.15 (97.95)
2 vs 4 0.05 (90.65) 0 (87.30) 0.05 (87.95) 6 vs 9 2.5 (98.85) 1.15 (98.55) 6.25 (98.30)
2 vs 5 0.5 (90.90) 0.3 (88.85) 1.05 (89.80) 7 vs 8 6.7 (98.55) 15.75 (98.00) 23.95 (97.90)
2 vs 6 0.55 (93.25) 0.4 (91.25) 1.4 (92.25) 7 vs 9 2.35 (98.00) 2.75 (97.90) 8.9 (96.95)
2 vs 7 0.6 (93.60) 0.7 (92.75) 2.1 (93.60) 8 vs 9 1.3 (96.30) 0.7 (96.10) 7.65 (95.15)
2 vs 8 4.15 (96.95) 8.2 (96.45) 14 (96.25)
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Figure 5.7 CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN, CNN-01-ABP’s accuracy on adver-
saries of CIFAR10 generated by PGD attack (ε = 16/255, α = 2/255, steps = 20).
X-axis is classes pair, Y-axis is accuracy on adversaries.
on adversaries stuck in a position under 20%. But we see CNN-01-ABP is still the
best one.
5.3 Adversaries’ Transferability
Some researchers claimed that there is a large-dimensional continuous subspace in the
adversarial sample space. This subspace is a very important part of the adversarial
space and is shared by different models to achieve mobility. The dimension of the
transferable adversarial subspace means that the learning boundaries learned by
different models are incredibly close in the input domain, and these boundaries are
far away from the data points in the adversarial direction [58]. This phenomenon
happens in object detection [60] also.
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Many works showed that adversaries’ transferability is a key to do black-box
attack successfully. In real world, most application service based on machine learning
or deep learning techniques would not release the model or parameter details to users,
they only allow users access to the input and output. Without the full information
of a target model, powerful white-box attack would not be possibly applied to hack
the system. In other worlds, doing hack on machine learning application through
black-box attack, which a kind of attack not rely on model’s information is more
practical than doing white-box attack in real world. How to increase adversaries’
transferability becomes a hot topic in black-box attack field. As the same time, many
works showed their ability on improving adversaries’ transferability [16, 63, 62].
In this section, we mainly focus on inner transferability and external trans-
ferability. Here, we define inner transferability is the transferability of adversaries
among the same type of structure with the same loss function. These models have
same structure, same optimization method and training detials, except that they
are under different initialization. For example, in previous section we see baseline
model MLP-BCE-BP ’s accuracy on CIFAR10 and STL10. This accuracy is not a
single model’s performance but a majority vote results of 8 models. These eight
models’ training under different random seed setting and different initialized weights,
other training details are the same. We evaluate each single vote’s adversaries’
transferability between each other, and show an example in Table 5.7. For external
transferability, we defined it as the transferability of adversaries from models with
different type of structure or loss function. The external adversaries’ transferability
results example is showed in Table 5.15. These attacks parameters’ setting are the
same as in the previous section.
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Table 5.7 Adversaries’ Transferability of MLP-BCE-BP and MLP-01-SCD on Class
Pair of 2 vs 4 From CIFAR10 Dataset
MLP-BCE-BP
source\target 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0.85 2.4 2.7 2.45 2.2 1.7 1.8 3.35
1 2.8 0.95 4.25 3.2 3.4 2.4 2.8 3.8
2 0.9 0.7 0.15 0.6 0.5 0.35 0.35 0.95
3 0.95 0.95 1.3 0.75 0.85 0.65 0.85 1.85
4 0.25 0.1 0.45 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.2 0.55
5 0.35 0.15 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.25 0.95
6 3.6 4.3 6 3.15 2.7 2.05 0.9 5.7
7 0.85 1.1 0.85 0.9 0.75 0.35 0.6 0.15
MLP-01-SCD
source\target 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0.3 61.4 67.8 57.85 60.45 63.3 63.65 57.85
1 65.85 0.3 64.3 61.35 61 64.1 70.85 58.45
2 60.75 62.25 0.15 58.65 60.05 55.95 66.7 57.3
3 59.5 55.2 62.3 0.2 64.6 54.6 65.65 61.9
4 63.1 62.2 60.7 65.2 0 56.15 52.75 60.25
5 61.65 64.65 60.55 58.55 59.5 0 59.65 57.2
6 64.25 70.1 56.9 64.7 58.65 64.1 0.4 57
7 59 69.45 59.15 64.95 60.05 63.9 54.4 0.3
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Table 5.8 Adversaries’ Transferability of CNN-BCE-BP and CNN-01-ABP on Class
Pair of 2 vs 4 From CIFAR10 Dataset
CNN-BCE-BP
source\target 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 3.15 3.35 3.1 2.3 2.85 6.35 3.65
1 2.3 0 3.05 2.1 2 2.25 3.2 1.45
2 5.8 6.95 0 5.1 3.55 7.6 5.2 9.35
3 2.1 1.75 2.15 0 2.1 1.95 3.45 2
4 1.85 2.95 1.95 2.45 0 1.85 2.05 1.7
5 1.4 1.95 2.45 1.75 1.1 0 3.55 1.75
6 4.1 3.65 2.3 3.7 1.3 4.35 0 4.3
7 1.5 1.45 3.2 1.85 1 1.35 3.1 0
CNN-01-ABP
source\target 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 62.75 57.5 59.65 51.65 57.4 60.6 57.15
1 51.2 0 48.8 53.85 50.15 53.95 51.35 53.4
2 50.65 55.2 0 55.25 46.85 51.05 50.25 50.65
3 47.45 53 49.65 0 43.75 52 53.6 51.4
4 57.4 65.75 59 61.35 0 59.55 63.55 59.45
5 51.85 59.4 51.05 55.35 48.5 0 47.6 53.5
6 56.6 59.85 51.9 59.4 53.25 51.05 0 53.6
7 56.1 61.35 57.2 59.15 53.6 58.5 56.25 0
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5.3.1 Adversaries’ Inner Transferability
Table 5.7 and 5.8 is an example of MLP’s and CNN’s inner adversaries’ transferability
on class pair 2 vs 4 of CIFAR10. For example, we trained 8 MLP-BCE-BP models
{M0,M1, ...,M7} on class pair 2 vs 4 of CIFAR10 {X, Y } with different random seed
{rd0, rd1, ..., rd7}, and then do PGD attack for each model to get their adversaries
{adv0, adv1, ..., adv7}. So in the table, we record accuracy Acc at position row i, col j








subject to xk ∈ advi, yk ∈ Y
(5.4)
In the Table 5.7, for MLP-BCE-BP, M1’s accuracy on M0’s adversaries is 2.4%,
M0’s accuracy on M1’s adversaries is 2.8%, and M0’s accuracy on the adversaries
from itself is 0.85%. This means M0 and M1’s adversaries could be shared between
each other, and this phenomenon is consistent with the argument that the decision
boundaries learned by different models are incredibly close in the input domain [57].
For MLP-01-SCD, M1’s accuracy on M0’s adversaries is 61.4%, M0’s accuracy on
M1’s adversaries is 65.85%, and M0’s accuracy on the adversaries from itself is 0.3%.
Compared to MLP-BCE-BP’s adversaries transferability, we can see MLP-01-SCD’s
adversaries transferability is obviously lower than MLP-BCE-BP’s in this class pair.
Higher accuracy on other models’ adversaries means MLP-01-SCD’s adversaries could
hardly transfer to models with the same structure, indicating that the transferability
attack on MLP-01-SCD would be ineffective.
In the Table 5.8, for CNN-BCE-BP, M1’s accuracy on M0’s adversaries is 3.15%,
M0’s accuracy on M1’s adversaries is 2.3%, and M0’s accuracy on the adversaries from
itself is 0%. For CNN-01-ABP, M1’s accuracy on M0’s adversaries is 62.75%, M0’s
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accuracy on M1’s adversaries is 51.2%, and M0’s accuracy on the adversaries from
itself is 0%. The situation is similar as we see in MLP’s results, which means our
zero-one loss models’ adversarial transferability attribute does not change as network
structure changes from MLP to CNN and even becomes deeper.
5.3.2 Inner Adversarial Transferability Results
We evaluated our baseline models’ inner adversaries transferability under FGSM and
PGD attack, averaged accuracy like in Table 5.7 and 5.8 exclude accuracy on the
diagnoal (white-box attack), averaged accuracy for each class pair and recorded them
in Table 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14 and their corresponding curve in Figures
5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13. From these figures we can see MLP-01-SCD
and CNN-01-ABP’s adversaries’ transferability is the weakest in their corresponding
groups. Optimizing zero-one loss will give non-unique solutions or decision boundary,
which makes each models’ adversaries generated by FGSM or PGD can only succeed
in itself rather than other models. This is different from that cross-entropy loss
optimized by SGD probably bring similar decision boundary for models if they are
under the same structure and trained on the same dataset.
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Table 5.9 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
Average Accuracy of Inner Adversarial Transferability Results Under FGSM Attacks
(A)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
0 vs 1 6.02 4.98 79.81 69.76 41.08 8.06 70.93 74.74
0 vs 2 1.45 3.35 77.00 56.63 40.91 26.05 81.18 83.11
0 vs 3 4.50 14.43 80.98 70.92 48.80 34.38 78.77 81.10
0 vs 4 0.87 5.32 82.55 63.48 62.91 43.65 77.82 78.90
0 vs 5 3.99 10.82 82.59 72.78 60.59 20.36 79.11 83.12
0 vs 6 3.81 16.30 87.00 73.26 52.71 21.06 79.17 81.62
0 vs 7 1.75 3.52 80.56 63.70 63.93 56.38 77.98 84.08
0 vs 8 1.27 2.29 69.24 44.62 47.49 4.49 71.39 70.48
0 vs 9 10.59 5.27 75.77 62.50 48.98 14.06 69.56 77.63
1 vs 2 3.46 7.62 82.41 72.51 38.69 52.86 78.18 85.11
1 vs 3 6.62 7.68 80.03 71.85 28.94 9.35 58.16 56.52
1 vs 4 2.67 5.29 83.61 75.97 45.95 3.11 58.75 57.83
1 vs 5 2.69 7.03 82.28 74.38 41.59 19.74 55.97 52.03
1 vs 6 1.65 8.60 85.38 76.44 33.04 1.28 61.74 65.57
1 vs 7 3.92 7.03 81.96 72.12 43.04 5.23 56.76 58.30
1 vs 8 6.90 4.05 76.78 57.66 40.58 33.99 72.95 85.17
1 vs 9 0.96 2.89 65.35 42.62 32.34 47.01 75.70 83.63
2 vs 3 3.48 12.05 65.74 51.54 28.26 44.79 77.39 82.73
2 vs 4 0.67 0.87 60.46 32.24 44.22 49.93 82.28 86.33
2 vs 5 3.52 6.32 66.89 48.79 31.96 49.70 74.20 84.69
2 vs 6 1.33 2.44 70.54 43.77 30.88 62.44 76.10 83.35
2 vs 7 0.71 2.37 72.26 45.59 25.89 59.53 78.51 85.01
2 vs 8 2.73 10.21 82.48 67.47 24.81 11.20 73.28 77.53
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Table 5.10 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
Average Accuracy of Inner Adversarial Transferability Results Under FGSM Attacks
(B)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
2 vs 9 4.87 11.66 81.88 67.40 26.68 7.72 60.03 60.39
3 vs 4 1.12 3.09 71.33 51.62 44.95 15.51 59.79 53.85
3 vs 5 1.11 12.28 57.94 31.39 38.89 10.90 52.21 50.20
3 vs 6 3.33 4.99 70.36 50.64 28.62 1.50 61.59 60.00
3 vs 7 1.12 1.90 70.47 38.47 19.12 1.81 55.56 52.37
3 vs 8 9.11 14.43 83.17 73.69 52.44 60.33 81.19 85.39
3 vs 9 3.51 8.45 78.61 66.22 46.41 45.93 75.78 80.50
4 vs 5 3.80 6.17 71.23 55.71 53.38 11.08 59.03 59.97
4 vs 6 0.50 2.28 67.41 37.32 45.48 2.57 64.64 63.33
4 vs 7 0.45 1.82 67.09 44.28 34.07 4.06 61.24 62.70
4 vs 8 6.55 16.64 84.29 65.31 49.92 68.37 82.98 87.65
4 vs 9 4.08 10.95 82.44 69.21 30.60 42.87 81.00 84.07
5 vs 6 1.24 3.09 73.55 54.90 33.49 3.69 55.47 51.99
5 vs 7 1.31 3.02 69.91 41.76 29.38 0.62 55.51 52.14
5 vs 8 5.16 16.88 84.06 75.13 59.17 71.89 80.07 86.72
5 vs 9 4.59 13.99 82.22 71.83 47.15 48.44 79.46 82.36
6 vs 7 1.98 2.43 78.11 51.57 34.94 1.96 60.77 61.16
6 vs 8 11.43 19.68 89.06 73.48 59.15 60.18 84.30 86.24
6 vs 9 3.37 10.81 83.52 71.86 39.39 55.69 77.64 81.36
7 vs 8 5.88 8.15 83.90 66.43 50.35 63.09 83.07 88.89
7 vs 9 3.69 9.60 78.68 60.91 46.26 49.90 79.12 84.06
8 vs 9 1.92 4.88 74.90 55.88 42.06 3.69 61.68 67.21
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Figure 5.8 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
average accuracy of inner adversarial transferability results exclude white-box attack
part. Adversaries are test dataset of CIFAR10 by FGSM attacks. X-axis is classes
pair, Y-axis is accuracy.
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Figure 5.9 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
average accuracy of inner adversarial transferability results exclude white-box attack
part. Adversaries are test dataset of STL10 by FGSM attacks. X-axis is classes pair,
Y-axis is accuracy.
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Table 5.11 CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN, CNN-01-ABP’s Average Accuracy of
Inner Adversarial Transferability Results Under FGSM Attacks
classes cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp classes cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp
0 vs 1 57.07 78.99 87.39 2 vs 9 50.7 78.67 85.53
0 vs 2 26.86 62.48 72.08 3 vs 4 18.17 39.12 66.14
0 vs 3 48.28 75.06 84.3 3 vs 5 6.28 21.85 54.58
0 vs 4 25.44 54.68 75.3 3 vs 6 28.31 51.44 66.81
0 vs 5 49.51 73.4 86.52 3 vs 7 9.57 36.73 63.34
0 vs 6 67.58 79.55 86.47 3 vs 8 54.06 74.34 87.26
0 vs 7 39.04 68.86 83.98 3 vs 9 42.83 72.06 79.37
0 vs 8 20.82 51.07 71.73 4 vs 5 28.92 49.71 70.48
0 vs 9 53.12 72.71 83.23 4 vs 6 11.65 42.63 64.32
1 vs 2 51.2 83.75 87.62 4 vs 7 9.08 41.99 65.5
1 vs 3 45.96 80.14 84.54 4 vs 8 46.53 71.59 83.92
1 vs 4 35.86 75.78 86.99 4 vs 9 38.19 76.27 83.66
1 vs 5 48.19 82.31 88.85 5 vs 6 32.54 48.53 69.05
1 vs 6 53.15 78.56 88.8 5 vs 7 13.49 37.94 67.5
1 vs 7 50.08 82.3 89.6 5 vs 8 66.38 78.36 89.74
1 vs 8 31.66 66.79 80.29 5 vs 9 50.91 76.23 83.24
1 vs 9 24.1 53.1 73.26 6 vs 7 24.22 59.97 77.27
2 vs 3 15.27 38.37 62.32 6 vs 8 63.45 79.81 88.81
2 vs 4 9.18 30.16 57.3 6 vs 9 50.93 76.08 86.76
2 vs 5 21.46 43.17 67.41 7 vs 8 50.72 73.3 89.19
2 vs 6 27.12 54.72 69.07 7 vs 9 37.52 69.75 83.7
2 vs 7 22.43 51.53 71.75 8 vs 9 39.1 64.47 77.41
2 vs 8 45.06 73.18 84.27
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Figure 5.10 CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN, CNN-01-ABP’s average accuracy of
inner adversarial transferability results exclude white-box attack part. Adversaries
are test dataset of CIFAR10 by FGSM attacks. X-axis is classes pair, Y-axis is
accuracy.
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Table 5.12 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
Average Accuracy of Inner Adversarial Transferability Results Under PGD Attacks
(A)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
0 vs 1 5.30 2.48 80.04 76.04 50.74 6.10 71.36 78.03
0 vs 2 1.16 1.57 76.48 64.70 53.89 25.42 77.24 84.60
0 vs 3 4.82 8.56 80.58 76.22 53.93 33.79 79.48 83.18
0 vs 4 1.06 1.85 82.09 71.67 68.34 42.14 77.77 81.76
0 vs 5 4.50 6.21 82.57 78.30 67.75 17.39 78.78 84.28
0 vs 6 4.20 11.52 86.15 79.19 64.18 20.27 80.64 84.30
0 vs 7 2.02 1.13 79.57 72.89 76.23 58.84 78.40 85.95
0 vs 8 1.76 1.06 68.79 54.90 54.73 3.18 70.02 75.20
0 vs 9 9.53 2.61 75.38 69.38 58.76 12.63 69.50 79.24
1 vs 2 3.40 3.38 82.14 78.78 51.22 56.87 73.60 86.63
1 vs 3 6.06 3.74 79.52 77.44 38.81 9.99 58.24 61.29
1 vs 4 2.26 1.41 83.96 80.79 54.40 2.76 58.46 63.85
1 vs 5 2.40 2.58 81.74 80.21 50.63 20.83 55.58 58.11
1 vs 6 1.48 2.87 85.37 82.27 46.81 1.00 62.11 69.38
1 vs 7 2.77 1.57 81.44 78.83 52.07 5.67 56.88 60.12
1 vs 8 6.37 2.30 76.31 64.42 51.78 32.39 73.07 86.86
1 vs 9 1.34 2.10 64.70 49.70 42.45 49.24 75.50 85.37
2 vs 3 4.01 10.05 65.05 57.56 37.74 45.12 75.88 84.44
2 vs 4 1.57 0.35 61.29 40.69 51.63 53.06 76.16 87.48
2 vs 5 4.55 5.18 67.25 56.48 35.83 52.35 77.45 86.15
2 vs 6 1.66 1.05 68.91 53.98 33.84 65.61 76.06 85.52
2 vs 7 0.62 1.09 71.19 57.87 34.24 62.50 79.04 86.52
2 vs 8 2.39 4.55 82.09 76.38 33.65 11.20 73.66 80.03
80
Table 5.13 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
Average Accuracy of Inner Adversarial Transferability Results Under PGD Attacks
(B)
CIFAR10 STL10
classes mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
2 vs 9 4.37 5.79 82.41 76.78 38.11 7.73 60.11 64.23
3 vs 4 1.44 1.62 71.19 57.85 53.34 18.04 59.96 61.09
3 vs 5 2.01 13.69 57.10 36.90 45.04 12.28 53.43 55.23
3 vs 6 3.14 3.53 69.49 56.82 40.44 1.21 60.56 66.00
3 vs 7 0.93 0.36 69.23 52.45 27.08 1.66 55.20 58.10
3 vs 8 8.26 7.52 82.65 79.80 58.47 63.68 81.26 87.14
3 vs 9 3.32 3.71 78.36 74.56 51.67 48.02 76.35 83.04
4 vs 5 4.22 4.63 68.66 64.34 58.02 11.43 58.23 64.94
4 vs 6 0.80 1.22 66.98 50.72 56.90 1.35 63.91 68.96
4 vs 7 0.42 1.15 70.35 58.15 47.70 2.70 61.36 68.01
4 vs 8 5.91 10.13 84.13 74.76 53.66 72.46 81.94 89.13
4 vs 9 4.06 5.39 82.62 78.99 37.01 44.93 81.08 85.95
5 vs 6 1.32 1.73 72.73 61.16 42.98 4.24 55.38 59.28
5 vs 7 1.11 1.32 68.67 53.14 41.35 0.46 56.29 57.48
5 vs 8 4.95 9.00 83.77 81.29 62.84 75.54 82.94 88.52
5 vs 9 3.98 7.49 81.94 78.73 52.88 52.72 77.70 84.43
6 vs 7 1.94 0.49 77.29 67.19 47.72 1.24 59.58 65.79
6 vs 8 10.70 9.56 88.43 82.74 64.07 63.61 84.55 88.50
6 vs 9 3.33 4.96 83.46 81.13 48.91 59.71 76.41 83.35
7 vs 8 5.11 2.02 83.65 75.92 60.09 66.58 82.45 90.01
7 vs 9 3.57 3.89 77.99 70.31 56.72 55.08 79.39 85.88
8 vs 9 1.82 2.35 74.60 66.69 51.97 3.47 62.42 70.75
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Figure 5.11 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
average accuracy of inner adversarial transferability results exclude white-box attack
part. Adversaries are test dataset of CIFAR10 by PGD attacks. X-axis is classes
pair, Y-axis is accuracy.
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Figure 5.12 MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD, MLP-BCE-SCD’s
average accuracy of inner adversarial transferability results exclude white-box attack
part. Adversaries are test dataset of STL10 by PGD attacks. X-axis is classes pair,
Y-axis is accuracy.
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Table 5.14 CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN, CNN-01-ABP’s Average Accuracy of
Inner Adversarial Transferability Results Under PGD Attacks
classes cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp classes cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp
0 vs 1 41.79 72.25 89.09 2 vs 9 37.84 74.13 88.27
0 vs 2 16.93 53.52 72.05 3 vs 4 7.21 22.14 66.71
0 vs 3 37.53 65.43 84.76 3 vs 5 2.35 16.82 52.62
0 vs 4 16.09 42.96 78.66 3 vs 6 14.62 39.85 69.73
0 vs 5 37.39 62.75 88.06 3 vs 7 5.34 25.13 66.29
0 vs 6 53.79 72.48 90.17 3 vs 8 42.71 63.09 89.02
0 vs 7 30.86 56.62 86.60 3 vs 9 26.80 69.32 84.24
0 vs 8 12.16 38.48 70.47 4 vs 5 14.35 37.01 69.99
0 vs 9 36.27 65.88 86.04 4 vs 6 4.36 25.83 67.37
1 vs 2 39.78 81.45 88.25 4 vs 7 4.37 35.69 63.99
1 vs 3 31.47 77.80 85.33 4 vs 8 31.97 61.70 84.60
1 vs 4 27.03 70.17 88.32 4 vs 9 26.55 72.34 88.45
1 vs 5 35.35 77.75 90.21 5 vs 6 13.88 36.44 74.48
1 vs 6 35.62 70.96 90.73 5 vs 7 6.30 26.11 69.31
1 vs 7 39.67 75.82 91.12 5 vs 8 53.09 66.72 90.38
1 vs 8 19.98 58.27 82.38 5 vs 9 36.79 72.53 88.42
1 vs 9 12.23 43.94 75.87 6 vs 7 13.40 51.77 78.30
2 vs 3 6.38 23.85 60.74 6 vs 8 50.18 72.07 89.99
2 vs 4 2.97 12.25 54.67 6 vs 9 34.81 68.78 88.67
2 vs 5 12.24 30.98 67.02 7 vs 8 37.29 59.91 89.96
2 vs 6 13.69 44.98 71.40 7 vs 9 27.31 63.14 86.48
2 vs 7 14.60 41.87 72.68 8 vs 9 22.37 55.13 81.85
2 vs 8 30.63 63.53 84.81
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Figure 5.13 CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN, CNN-01-ABP’s average accuracy of
inner adversarial transferability results exclude white-box attack part. Adversaries
are test dataset of CIFAR10 by PGD attacks. X-axis is classes pair, Y-axis is accuracy.
85
5.3.3 Adversaries’ External Transferability
Table 5.15 Adversaries’ Transferability Between MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN,
MLP-01-SCD, and MLP-BCE-SCD on CIFAR10 Dataset
0 vs 1
model mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
mlpbcebp 0.4 0.45 66.45 3.7
mlpbceban 1.45 0.1 69.95 4.25
mlp01scd 81.95 75.6 26.9 71.5
mlpbcescd 26.05 14.95 65.45 0.15
0 vs 2
model mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcescd
mlpbcebp 0 0 66.2 0.2
mlpbceban 0.15 0 66.45 0.35
mlp01scd 80.35 79.85 34.6 76.6
mlpbcescd 11.95 7.95 61.2 0
Tables 5.16 shows an example of adversaries’ external transferability between
CNN baseline models in class pair 0 vs 1 and class pair 0 vs 2 on the CIFAR10 dataset.
We generate adversaries through PGD attack for models list in the first column and
then evaluate the accuracy of models list in the first row. We only evaluate adversarial
transferability under PGD attacksFor example, in class pair 0 vs 1, MLP-BCE-BAN’s
accuracy on MLP-BCE-BP’s adversaries is 0.45%, almost the same as MLP-BCE-
BP’s. This means MLP-BCE-BP’s adversaries can be transferred to MLP-BCE-
BAN. In other words, if we want to generate adversaries for attacking MLP-BCE-
BAN, we do not need accurate weights’ information from MLP-BCE-BAN. We could
instead generate adversaries for attacking an MLP-BCE-BP model trained on the
same dataset to succeed. However, MLP-01-SCD’s accuracy evaluated on MLP-BCE-
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Table 5.16 Adversaries’ Transferability Between CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN,
and CNN-01-ABP on CIFAR10 Dataset
0 vs 1
model cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp
cnnbcebp 6.95 17.35 47.9
cnnbceban 40.85 8.7 60.8
cnn01abp 83.6 80.15 19.95
0 vs 2
model cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp
cnnbcebp 0.7 12.8 15.4
cnnbceban 19.8 2.1 22.8
cnn01abp 51.55 51.85 2.85
BP’s adversaries is 66.45%, much higher than 0.45%, indicating adversaries transfer
from model MLP-BCE-BP to MLP-01-SCD is harder than transfer to MLP-BCE-
BAN. MLP-BCE-Bp’s accuracy evaluated on MLP-BCE-BAN’s adversaries is 1.45%,
which is 68% lower than MLP-01-SCD’s accuracy evaluated on the same adversaries
MLP-BCE-BAN’s adversaries are also harder to transfer to MLP-01-SCD than MLP-
BCE-BP. In addition, MLP-01-SCD’s adversaries cannot transfer to either MLP-
BCE-BP (81.95%) or MLP-BCE-BAN (75.6%) means MLP-01-SCD’s adversaries’
transferability are very low. The same phenomenon happens in class pair 0 vs 2.
Tables 5.16 shows an example of adversaries’ external transferability between
MLP baseline models in class pair 0 vs 1 and class pair 0 vs 2 on CIFAR10 dataset. We
generate adversaries through PGD attack for models list in the first column and then
evaluate the accuracy of models list in the first row. For example, in class pair 0 vs 1,
CNN-BCE-BAN’s accuracy on MLP-BCE-BP’s adversaries is 17.35%, which is only
10% higher than MLP-BCE-BP’s but 30% lower than CNN-01-ABP’s. This means
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CNN-BCE-BP’s adversaries can transfer to CNN-BCE-BAN easier than transfer to
CNN-01-ABP. However, CNN-BCE-BP (40.85%) and CNN-01-ABP (60.8%) perform
well in defending adversaries generated from CNN-BCE-BAN. Additionally, CNN-
BCE-BP (83.6%) and CNN-BCE-BAN (80.15%) are robust in defending CNN-01-
ABP’s adversaries. In class pair 0 vs 2, the overall robustness for all models declined,
and CNN-01-ABP does not perform significantly better than the other two models
on defending adversaries.
5.3.4 External Adversarial Transferability Results
Tables 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, and 5.20 show adversaries transferability between MLP
baseline models in each class pair of CIFAR10 and STL10. For defending adver-
saries generated from either MLP-BCE-BP or MLP-BCE-BAN, MLP-01-SCD is
significantly better than another method with p-values below 0.05 (< 0.05) under
Equal Variance T-Test. MLP-BCE-BP and MLP-BCE-BAN are robust on defending
MLP-01-SCD’s adversaries.
Tables 5.21 and 5.22 show adversaries transferability between CNN baseline
models in each class pair of CIFAR10. CNN-01-ABP is more robust than CNN-BCE-
BAN when defending CNN-BCE-BP’s adversaries with p-value of 0.00001 (< 0.05)
under Equal Variance T-Test. However, CNN-01-ABP is not significantly more robust
than CNN-BCE-BP when defending CNN-BCE-BAN’s adversaries with p-value of
0.06 (> 0.05) under Equal Variance T-Test. Both CNN-BCE-BP and CNN-BCE-
BAN are robust in defending CNN-01-ABP’s adversaries.
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Table 5.17 Adversaries’ Transferability Between MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN,
and MLP-01-SCD on CIFAR10 Dataset Generated by PGD Attack (A)
Source mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd
target mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcebp mlp01scd mlpbcebp mlpbceban
0 vs 1 0.45 66.45 1.45 69.95 81.95 75.6
0 vs 2 0 66.2 0.15 66.45 80.35 79.85
0 vs 3 3 73.45 1.25 72.7 87.4 84.35
0 vs 4 0.55 75.5 0.35 74.9 83.95 83.1
0 vs 5 1.2 73.85 0.75 74.5 89.6 87.1
0 vs 6 1.85 73.15 1.7 72.35 88.4 85.85
0 vs 7 0.15 71.9 0.5 73.8 82.75 80.2
0 vs 8 0 46.7 0.15 52.65 68.25 68.4
0 vs 9 0.45 66.25 2.55 69.1 83.4 78.85
1 vs 2 0.55 70.55 0.9 71.9 87.45 83.25
1 vs 3 0.35 54.1 2.15 60.55 84.25 78.95
1 vs 4 0.35 70.1 1.75 71.8 83.65 75.1
1 vs 5 1.4 70.55 1.2 66.35 86.45 80.8
1 vs 6 1 65.15 1.05 66.6 87.9 82.85
1 vs 7 0.25 63.05 1.35 66.75 87.6 82.45
1 vs 8 0.65 54.45 2.95 61 76.6 71.7
1 vs 9 0 44.1 0.05 46.45 71.05 67.15
2 vs 3 1.35 44.8 0.7 42.45 66.85 61.55
2 vs 4 0 35.2 0 38.65 63.75 61.95
2 vs 5 0.2 44.6 0.25 51.95 71 66.8
2 vs 6 0.2 45.95 0.35 51.35 73.2 70.35
2 vs 7 0 45.65 0.05 48.85 70.75 65.35
2 vs 8 0.55 71.5 0.95 72.2 88.55 86.05
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Table 5.18 Adversaries’ Transferability Between MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN,
and MLP-01-SCD on CIFAR10 Dataset Generated by PGD Attack (B)
Source mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd
target mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcebp mlp01scd mlpbcebp mlpbceban
2 vs 9 0.35 68.7 0.65 70.55 84.5 80.4
3 vs 4 0.1 47.6 0.2 48.6 66.7 63.5
3 vs 5 0.15 34.65 0.05 35.1 57.9 56.95
3 vs 6 0.1 36.25 0.65 39.7 67.2 62.5
3 vs 7 0.05 38.9 0.1 41.7 70.3 66.55
3 vs 8 1.1 73.95 3.1 76.05 88.2 84.5
3 vs 9 0.65 68 0.85 65.05 79.55 72.9
4 vs 5 0.65 48.4 0.55 52.65 68.8 62.2
4 vs 6 0.1 38.75 0.05 38.95 66.5 62.6
4 vs 7 0.05 45.85 0 44.75 60.25 54.7
4 vs 8 1.45 74.55 2.25 74.3 87.5 85.7
4 vs 9 0.3 69.15 0.75 69.45 85.9 80.55
5 vs 6 0.05 49.2 0.25 50.55 71.15 66.95
5 vs 7 0 44.5 0.05 43.35 73.65 70.2
5 vs 8 2.45 78.85 0.9 76.8 89.25 86.15
5 vs 9 1.05 71.4 1.3 71.4 88.65 85.35
6 vs 7 0.35 46.75 0.3 48.15 73.75 67.75
6 vs 8 2.85 76.9 1.4 81.2 90.9 87.75
6 vs 9 1 74.4 0.4 69.6 86.45 83.1
7 vs 8 0.45 69.55 1.35 71.4 87.5 83.3
7 vs 9 0.65 58.95 0.6 57.55 85.45 82.2
8 vs 9 0.5 61.65 0.2 61.8 77.3 73.6
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Table 5.19 Adversaries’ Transferability Between MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN,
and MLP-01-SCD on STL10 Dataset Generated by PGD Attack (A)
Source mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd
target mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcebp mlp01scd mlpbcebp mlpbceban
0 vs 1 4.94 54.81 4.19 50.69 80.94 81.69
0 vs 2 5.87 76.5 9.56 76.88 84.94 82.94
0 vs 3 16.19 59 16.12 60 84.25 83.94
0 vs 4 17.56 61.62 27.25 63.62 84.62 84.5
0 vs 5 23.25 61.81 23.75 58 82.94 82.81
0 vs 6 16.81 65.19 10.94 62.31 85.12 84.31
0 vs 7 32.31 67.87 22.19 68.87 86.31 86
0 vs 8 5.5 56 9.75 54.06 77.56 76.5
0 vs 9 7.12 69.37 9.25 68.12 79.06 78.31
1 vs 2 18.69 69.06 12.62 70.06 87.44 85.19
1 vs 3 0.31 25.06 1.56 23.69 64.19 64.88
1 vs 4 3.19 36.5 7.87 33.25 67.62 67.56
1 vs 5 7.69 35.62 6.5 24.69 62.12 62.12
1 vs 6 0.62 36.81 2.19 32.81 71.31 71
1 vs 7 4.25 35.81 4.63 23.12 61.94 60.69
1 vs 8 17.62 69.81 12.62 68.94 89.31 87.62
1 vs 9 15.75 67.44 12.12 68.12 86.87 84.87
2 vs 3 9.69 67.94 8.19 70.31 86 84.25
2 vs 4 14.25 74.31 16.12 78.06 88.31 86.62
2 vs 5 14.75 67.44 14.75 71.75 86.81 85.37
2 vs 6 20.37 66.75 16.62 71.44 87.69 86.37
2 vs 7 23.5 67.56 14.62 69.75 87.81 86.06
2 vs 8 0.88 67.06 1.31 66.31 80.5 78.62
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Table 5.20 Adversaries’ Transferability Between MLP-BCE-BP, MLP-BCE-BAN,
and MLP-01-SCD on STL10 Dataset Generated by PGD Attack (B)
Source mlpbcebp mlpbceban mlp01scd
target mlpbceban mlp01scd mlpbcebp mlp01scd mlpbcebp mlpbceban
2 vs 9 0.12 32.87 1.25 37 68.56 68.44
3 vs 4 2.19 35.56 4.25 26.37 67.12 68.06
3 vs 5 0.56 28.06 2.19 18.63 58.94 58.56
3 vs 6 0.25 27 1.25 25.56 68.94 69.31
3 vs 7 0.06 21.37 1.06 19.94 63.19 61.75
3 vs 8 25.5 69.31 25.87 71.06 89 88.81
3 vs 9 16.62 66.75 20.06 69.94 86 84
4 vs 5 19 48.06 9.06 34 67.62 65.56
4 vs 6 9.81 47.19 6.69 39.5 68 69.62
4 vs 7 2.56 32.81 1.37 22.44 69.19 69.12
4 vs 8 34.25 68.62 32.69 71.63 90.19 90.19
4 vs 9 10.69 69.75 16.88 71.88 87 85.75
5 vs 6 0.44 25.87 1.06 25.69 63.25 63.75
5 vs 7 0.75 28.81 1.06 20.81 61 62.19
5 vs 8 34.56 69.12 39.69 72.94 91.06 90.62
5 vs 9 15 66.62 25.19 69.12 86.44 85
6 vs 7 3.44 28.94 3.25 27.5 68.56 68.75
6 vs 8 22.94 76.44 39 77.56 90.44 89.69
6 vs 9 18.44 67.94 21.69 67.81 85.62 84.56
7 vs 8 30.94 75.94 24.44 74.44 91.12 90.69
7 vs 9 15.31 65.87 19.94 67.87 86.19 85.37
8 vs 9 1.62 55.06 0.31 54.44 72.31 72.37
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Table 5.21 Adversaries’ Transferability Between CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN,
and CNN-01-ABP on CIFAR10 Dataset Generated by PGD Attack (A)
source cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp
target cnnbceban cnn01abp cnnbcebp cnn01abp cnnbcebp cnnbceban
0 vs 1 17.35 47.9 40.85 60.8 83.6 80.15
0 vs 2 12.8 15.4 19.8 22.8 51.55 51.85
0 vs 3 25.75 36.25 38.65 41.3 73.3 68.65
0 vs 4 5.35 11.4 10.95 16.95 52.95 48.4
0 vs 5 20.5 32.2 34.3 42.45 76.45 72.55
0 vs 6 29.3 31.85 44.55 43.6 82.8 80.35
0 vs 7 17.35 27.2 23.65 36.1 70.1 68.75
0 vs 8 5.35 13.7 14.15 17.6 52.35 41.9
0 vs 9 17.95 40.9 33.6 49.3 77.35 72.25
1 vs 2 26.1 35.1 56.25 60.15 80.85 76.8
1 vs 3 19.65 31.15 47.9 50.3 74.35 68.95
1 vs 4 14.55 24.8 34.25 41.8 71.8 67.1
1 vs 5 20 31.45 47.75 49.85 77.3 74.65
1 vs 6 13.35 23.85 37.25 39.7 77.1 71.4
1 vs 7 15.65 32.4 46.7 51.5 81.6 77.05
1 vs 8 7.1 20.5 22.55 33.55 65.35 56.95
1 vs 9 1.2 17.6 6.95 29.75 65.1 57.65
2 vs 3 2.1 7.85 4 10.45 38 31.05
2 vs 4 0.1 1.9 2.05 3.4 26.8 17.5
2 vs 5 2.7 9.75 8.05 15.3 45.8 39.05
2 vs 6 3.95 10.55 12.4 20.75 48.55 42.75
2 vs 7 3.55 13.7 15.95 23.05 55.55 43.9
2 vs 8 20.45 32.95 30.3 40.6 73.85 71.45
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Table 5.22 Adversaries’ Transferability Between CNN-BCE-BP, CNN-BCE-BAN,
and CNN-01-ABP on CIFAR10 Dataset Generated by PGD Attack (B)
source cnnbcebp cnnbceban cnn01abp
target cnnbceban cnn01abp cnnbcebp cnn01abp cnnbcebp cnnbceban
2 vs 9 15.75 39.75 45.35 57.25 77.2 69.6
3 vs 4 2.8 8.4 4.9 11.55 37.95 29.55
3 vs 5 1.3 3.8 2.85 4.6 32.3 28
3 vs 6 2.3 7.55 9.9 12.5 45.15 33.7
3 vs 7 0.95 5.75 5.1 9.45 34.95 23.8
3 vs 8 21.05 36.7 39.55 42.55 81.15 73.45
3 vs 9 8.6 23.65 37.7 44.25 66.5 57.75
4 vs 5 5.85 9.5 9.7 13.8 52.2 46.95
4 vs 6 0.2 2.95 3.55 7.75 34.05 25.45
4 vs 7 1.15 6.25 4.35 11.2 38.95 32.35
4 vs 8 17.5 28.6 31.4 37.25 73.05 64.65
4 vs 9 12.55 24.25 31.65 41.55 68.4 63.45
5 vs 6 2.65 6.95 7.75 10.7 44.1 39.95
5 vs 7 1.05 9.25 4.75 10.45 49.7 35.05
5 vs 8 24.8 41.25 46.4 48.6 85.05 79.05
5 vs 9 9.75 27.05 40.05 44.5 75.5 67.9
6 vs 7 2.25 9.85 15.05 21.3 55.85 44.05
6 vs 8 29.45 37.1 46.55 44.1 83.15 78.45
6 vs 9 6 15.75 25.7 25.5 72.45 62.6
7 vs 8 25.05 38 33.5 46.7 78.75 75.95
7 vs 9 8.2 28.3 23.2 39.05 70.35 65.4
8 vs 9 6.8 23.4 23.65 33.4 63.35 54.7
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5.4 Decision Based Attack
Except for transferability attacks, there is another type of black-box attack method,
Decision-based attack. Considering that the users generally can access the neural
networks’ predicted category only, rather than accurate probability in the real world.
score-based attack such as variants of JSMA [47], Carlini & Wagner attack [10], and
ZOO [12] can not be deployed to attack DNN successfully.
Brendel proposed a decision-based adversarial attack, which achieves similar
performance as white-box attack[7]. But relying on the huge number of model queries
prevents it from being practical in real-world applications. Jianbo [11] propose a
query-efficient decision-based attack in 2019, which requires significantly fewer queries
from the target model to acquire competitive performance in attack.
We deployed Decision Based Attack and HopSkipJump Attack to our baseline
models and evaluated their robustness in defending this kind of black-box attack
method in this section.
5.4.1 Decision Based Attack Results
We applied Decision-based Attack1 implemented in IBM Adversarial Robustness
360 Toolbox package2. Hyperparameters setting: untargetted L2 distance attack,
sample size=10000, delta=0.01, epsilon=0.01, step adapt=0.02, num trail=100,
init eval=100, max iters=40, train size=100.
In each class pair from CIFAR10, we randomly pick 100 samples that are
correctly classified by all four baseline models for synthesizing adversaries by
Decision-based Attack. We take the median L2 distance of each pair and record
the results in Tables 5.23 and 5.24. Figures 5.14 and 5.15 show summary curve of





For MLP baseline models’ results, MLP-01-SCD’s median L2 distance is not
better than MLP-BCE-BP with p-value of 0.026 (> 0.05) under Equal Variance T-
Test. But MLP-BCE-BAN performs significantly better than MLP-BCE-BP with
p-value of 0.01 (< 0.05) under Equal Variance T-Test.
For CNN baseline models’ results, CNN-01-ABP’s median L2 distance is
significantly better than CNN-BCE-BP with p-value of 0 (< 0.05) under Equal
Variance T-Test. But CNN-BCE-BAN performs similar as CNN-01-ABP with p-value
of 0.93 (> 0.05) under Equal Variance T-Test.
The Sign activation model’s overall L2 distance under Decision-based attack is
larger than ReLU activation models, indicating Sign activation prevents Decision-
based attack from searching a minimum distortion in a few queries. We do not know
if these model will achieve a similar L2 distance after a large number of queries or
iterations run in Decision-based attack, but with limited number of queries available,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.24 Median L2 Distance Between Adversary and Clean Data of Decision-
based Attack for Attacking CNN Baseline Models
class CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP class CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP
0 vs 1 6.871 7.454 7.097 2 vs 9 6.527 7.407 7.484
0 vs 2 5.769 7.478 7.020 3 vs 4 4.059 4.766 5.658
0 vs 3 6.475 8.497 8.799 3 vs 5 3.559 5.656 4.033
0 vs 4 5.220 6.251 6.361 3 vs 6 4.365 5.607 4.551
0 vs 5 6.432 8.298 8.627 3 vs 7 4.221 5.439 6.426
0 vs 6 7.677 8.011 8.287 3 vs 8 6.724 8.592 8.394
0 vs 7 6.825 9.567 8.432 3 vs 9 5.372 7.279 7.020
0 vs 8 5.291 7.717 8.108 4 vs 5 5.938 9.562 8.576
0 vs 9 5.830 5.883 5.655 4 vs 6 4.172 5.147 4.745
1 vs 2 6.458 8.138 7.543 4 vs 7 4.001 6.703 6.402
1 vs 3 5.110 5.770 6.903 4 vs 8 7.523 9.948 8.748
1 vs 4 6.625 7.445 6.745 4 vs 9 6.533 8.031 7.039
1 vs 5 6.246 6.986 6.966 5 vs 6 5.526 5.968 6.475
1 vs 6 7.521 8.286 8.358 5 vs 7 4.388 6.104 5.900
1 vs 7 7.049 8.167 8.077 5 vs 8 7.297 8.056 9.074
1 vs 8 5.687 6.491 6.833 5 vs 9 6.264 7.417 7.258
1 vs 9 4.624 6.485 6.694 6 vs 7 5.710 7.134 6.527
2 vs 3 3.840 5.302 5.658 6 vs 8 7.645 7.940 7.692
2 vs 4 3.259 4.459 8.762 6 vs 9 6.559 7.803 7.780
2 vs 5 4.634 5.323 5.734 7 vs 8 6.601 9.663 9.224
2 vs 6 5.658 5.750 5.355 7 vs 9 5.795 6.970 7.172
2 vs 7 5.452 6.805 6.886 8 vs 9 5.295 5.741 5.699
2 vs 8 6.928 7.839 7.531
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Figure 5.14 Median L2 distance between adversary and clean data of Decision-
based attack for MLP baseline models.
5.4.2 HopSkipJump Attack Results
We applied HopSkipJump Attack3 implemented in IBM Adversarial Robustness
360 Toolbox package4. Hyperparameters setting: untargetted L2 distance attack,
max eval=10000, init eval=100, max iters=40, train size=100.
In each class pair from CIFAR10, we randomly pick 100 samples that are
correctly classified by all four baseline models for synthesizing adversaries by
HopSkipJump Attack. We take the median L2 distance of each pair and record
the results in Tables 5.25 and 5.26. Figures 5.16 and 5.17 show summary curve of
results in Tables 5.25 and 5.26.
For MLP baseline models’ results, MLP-01-SCD’s median L2 distance is





Figure 5.15 Median L2 distance between adversary and clean data of Decision-
based attack for CNN baseline models.
Variance T-Test. But MLP-BCE-BAN performs similar as MLP-01-SCD with p-value
of 0.34 (> 0.05) under Equal Variance T-Test.
For CNN baseline models’ results, CNN-01-ABP’s median L2 distance is
significantly better than CNN-BCE-BP with p-value of 0 (< 0.05) under Equal
Variance T-Test. But CNN-BCE-BAN performs similar as CNN-01-ABP with p-value
of 0.09 (> 0.05) under Equal Variance T-Test.
The Sign activation model’s overall L2 distance under HopSkipJump attack is
larger than ReLU activation models, indicating Sign activation prevent HopSkipJump
attack from searching a minimum distortion in a few queries. We do not know if these
model will achieve a similar L2 distance after a large number of queries or iterations
run in HopSkipJump attack, but with limited number of queries available, Sign
activation looks more robust in defending HopSkipJump attack. Another reason is
100
each votes’ adversaries could hardly transfer to each other, results that the ensembling
becomes more robust as the number of votes increased [67].
Figure 5.16 Median L2 distance between adversary and clean data of HopSkipJump





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.26 Median L2 Distance Between Adversary and Clean Data of
HopSkipJump Attack for Attacking CNN Baseline Models
class CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP class CNN-BCE-BP CNN-BCE-BAN CNN-01-ABP
0 vs 1 1.652 5.919 5.167 2 vs 9 1.470 5.972 5.053
0 vs 2 1.109 5.802 5.163 3 vs 4 0.740 3.761 4.044
0 vs 3 1.715 7.043 5.785 3 vs 5 0.583 3.607 2.576
0 vs 4 1.176 5.015 4.464 3 vs 6 0.951 3.486 3.224
0 vs 5 1.570 6.668 6.055 3 vs 7 0.824 4.423 4.682
0 vs 6 1.918 5.655 5.110 3 vs 8 1.806 6.630 5.876
0 vs 7 1.628 7.621 6.627 3 vs 9 1.406 4.986 4.882
0 vs 8 1.038 5.627 5.163 4 vs 5 1.068 4.588 4.357
0 vs 9 1.294 4.607 3.813 4 vs 6 0.781 3.451 3.367
1 vs 2 1.641 5.940 5.048 4 vs 7 0.700 3.845 3.902
1 vs 3 1.387 4.872 5.057 4 vs 8 1.546 6.745 6.611
1 vs 4 1.370 6.207 5.503 4 vs 9 1.365 6.329 5.588
1 vs 5 1.732 5.476 5.197 5 vs 6 0.979 4.039 3.222
1 vs 6 1.810 6.761 6.396 5 vs 7 0.860 4.756 4.590
1 vs 7 1.685 6.385 6.574 5 vs 8 1.918 6.437 5.824
1 vs 8 1.207 5.351 4.907 5 vs 9 1.679 5.410 4.749
1 vs 9 0.907 4.123 3.970 6 vs 7 1.234 4.307 4.049
2 vs 3 0.788 3.600 2.879 6 vs 8 2.008 5.523 5.350
2 vs 4 0.583 3.544 3.211 6 vs 9 1.506 5.225 5.050
2 vs 5 0.792 3.817 3.764 7 vs 8 1.621 6.466 6.460
2 vs 6 0.881 3.388 3.009 7 vs 9 1.159 5.246 5.277
2 vs 7 1.059 4.346 4.673 8 vs 9 1.192 4.180 3.768
2 vs 8 1.606 6.397 5.580
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Figure 5.17 Median L2 distance between adversary and clean data of HopSkipJump
attack for CNN baseline models.
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5.5 Conclusion
This chapter conducted two gradient-based attack methods, FGSM and PGD, for
white-box attacking our MLP and CNN baseline models. After that, we evaluated
the inner and external adversarial transferability between each model.
Based on the observation in white-box attack section, we could say that
Stochatic Coordinate Descent optimization helps model to be more robust in
defending FGSM attacks. Because gradient-free method makes models’ gradient be
hardly estimated for one-step gradient-based attack. After doing PGD attack, a
stronger multiple steps gradient estimating attack, the advantage of SCD disappears
on MLP-BCE-SCD. However, MLP-01-SCD is still performing well, which means
zero-one loss helps defend this kind of white-box attack. The robustness is not
because of Sign activation only, since MLP-BCE-BAN is hard to defend either FGSM
and PGD, even though its activation is Sign. And the adversary attack results of
CNN is consistent with MLP’s. It reveals that zero-one loss works on improving the
robustness of either a shallow model like MLP or a deeper model like CNN. Even
though backpropagation is included in ABP training strategy, backpropagation does
not lower zero-one loss models’ robustness too much in defending white-box attacks.
In adversarial transferability section, we noticed that MLP-01-SCD and CNN-
01-ABP are outstandingly robust in defending inner adversaries, which synthesized
from the network with the same structure and loss function. Benefits from non-unique
solutions for solving zero-one loss problem, zero-one loss models’ hyperplane might
be different in each single run. However, cross-entropy loss optimized by SGD would
results in similar hyperplanes in each run, the main reason that cause adversaries
transfer easily between each other. Nevertheless, zero-one loss does not enable
CNN models robust in external adversarial transferability, even though MLP-01-SCD
performs better than other structures in MLP experiment group.
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Decision-based attack and HopSkipJump attacks’ results reveal that Sign
activation in a neural network might decline these attacks’ power. Nevertheless,
zero-one loss does not affect the robustness clearly.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusion
This dissertation designed a Sign activation neural network framework, which used
zero-one loss as loss function. This dissertation implemented a novel method,
Stochastic Coordinate Descent (SCD), to optimize zero-one loss function for MLP
structure series. Compared to Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), SCD can achieve
similar performance in optimizing the same type of neural network on the CIFAR10
and STL10 datasets. In order to train Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) effec-
tively and efficiently, a variant of SCD that ignoring the bias is developed associated
with corresponding training strategy such as multi-phase training and Additional
Backpropagation Penetration (ABP). These modifications on SCD significantly speed
up the convergence of zero-one loss in training a deep neural network. Lastly, several
commonly used adversarial attack methods are applied to measure the adversarial
robustness differences between zero-one loss model and cross-entropy model, covering
white-box attack, decision-based attack, and adversaries’ transferability.
6.2 Future Work
Even though the SCD algorithm works well on both MLP and CNN structure, it is
necessary to develop a more efficient optimization method for training deeper zero
one loss Sign activated neural network. SCD’s feature that updating one coordinate
in each iteration can hardly bring optimal weights, which are very different from what
they look like initially. Reducing the number of training iterations and making weights
update more effective in each step are keys to the success of training a deeper neural
network. Currently, only binary classification results are showed in this dissertation.
Because of that zero-one loss being directly applied in multi-class problems will result
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in massive local minima during training. Looking forward to finding a better multi-
class version of zero-one loss is an excellent way to solve multi-class classification
problems. This dissertation does not include adversarial training, which is a popular
method to improve deep neural networks’ adversarial robustness. Training on clean
data and adversaries synthesized by gradient-based attacks like FGSM and PGD
makes the model more robust to their adversaries. However, this process does not
work in the SCD algorithm. So developing a new adversarial training method is
worthy to enable zero one loss models to become more robust.
108
REFERENCES
[1] Ethem Alpaydin. Machine Learning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.
[2] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. Obfuscated gradients give a
false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples. In
International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 274–283. PMLR, 2018.
[3] Peter L Bartlett, Michael I Jordan, and Jon D McAuliffe. Large margin classifiers:
Convex loss, low noise, and convergence rates. In Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 1173–1180. Citeseer, 2003.
[4] Shai Ben-David, Nadav Eiron, and Philip M Long. On the difficulty of approximately
maximizing agreements. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 66(3):496–
514, 2003.
[5] Battista Biggio, Blaine Nelson, and Pavel Laskov. Poisoning attacks against support
vector machines. In 29th International Conference on Machine Learning, pages
1467–1474, 2012.
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